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1 Introduction
Matching markets are two-sided markets, where agents on each side of the market have preferences
over matching with agents on the other side. For example, social interactions lead individuals
to find marital partners, production tasks are assigned to workers, and auctions sort buyers with
sellers. While the economic theory of matching models has been around for more than five decades,
the literature on empirical matching models is relatively recent (see Chiappori and Salanié, 2016,
for a review).
An important strand of this literature focuses on the one-to-one matching model, in which
every agent forms at most one match. Each possible match generates a surplus (hereafter, match
surplus). In the framework where utilities are perfectly transferable, agents can share the match
surplus with their partners without frictions. Since Becker (1973), the one-to-one matching model
with perfectly transferable utilities (hereafter, 1to1TU) has been extensively used in household
economics to represent the marriage market (see Chiappori, 2017, for a review).1 In particu-
lar, researchers have exploited the 1to1TU model to estimate the systematic part of the match
surplus. Recovering the systematic match surplus is useful in itself, for example, to investigate
sorting patterns and how they change over time, to learn about the complementarities and sub-
stitutabilities of partner characteristics, to assess the efficiency and welfare implications of the
status-quo assignment, and to measure the impact of pre-marital decisions on the match surplus
sharing rule.
In Section 2, we report a survey of the most relevant empirical papers that use the 1to1TU
model to represent the marriage market. All such papers proceed under strong parametric distri-
butional restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity. These restrictions amount to imposing i.i.d.
standard Extreme Value Type I taste shocks, independently distributed from covariates. These
restrictions make the 1to1TU model just identified with data on one large market and allow one
to point identify the systematic match surplus via standard Multinomial Logit formulas (Choo
and Siow, 2006).
The motivation for using the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model is computational simplicity.
However, this framework may lead to paradoxes contrasting with economic sense. For example, it
is well known that the one-sided Multinomial Logit model is inherently linked to the IIA axiom and
severely restricts cross-elasticities. The same holds in two-sided markets and causes undesirable
comparative static predictions, as explained in Graham (2013a) and Galichon and Salanié (2019).
Further, independence of taste shocks from covariates can induce biases if there is underlying
endogeneity or conditional heteroskedasticity.
The fact that widespread empirical practices rest on the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model
raises a number of questions. Does the 1to1TU model retain any identifying power on the sys-
1The 1to1TU model has also been used to study matching of CEOs to firms (Chen, 2017), matching of
academics to offices (Baccara, İmrohoroğlu, Wilson, and Yariv, 2012), merging of banks (Akkus, Cookson, and
Hortaçsu, 2016), formation of research alliances (Mindruda, Moeen, and Agarwal, 2016), and collaboration between
academics and firms (Mindruda, 2013; Banal-Estañol, Macho-Stadler, and Pérez-Castrillo, 2018).
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tematic match surplus without restrictions on the taste shock distribution, when we have data on
one large market? If not, is it still possible to recover some information on the systematic match
surplus under nonparametric assumptions on the taste shock distribution? How are the answers
to relevant policy questions driven by the parametric assumptions typically imposed on the taste
shock distribution? The contribution of our paper is to address these issues and, by doing so,
offer methodological guidance for researchers who wish to consider more robust alternatives to
(or, do sensitivity checks of) the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model.
In Section 4, we start by observing that, if the taste shock distribution is not assumed to be
fully known by the researcher, then the 1to1TU model is under-identified with data on one large
market (Galichon and Salanie, 2020). We show that, in the absence of any restriction on the taste
shock distribution, the under-identification issue is severe, as the 1to1TU model is completely
uninformative about the systematic match surplus. Formally, this means that, for every possible
value of the systematic match surplus, there exists a taste shock distribution which when combined
with that value of the systematic match surplus, rationalises the data.
We proceed by investigating whether the 1to1TU model retains any information on the sys-
tematic match surplus under various classes of nonparametric assumptions on the taste shock
distribution (for instance, independence of taste shocks from covariates, quantile restrictions,
symmetry restrictions, and identically distributed marginals). Answering this question poses the
challenge of tractably characterising the identified set of the systematic match surplus. We do that
by extending the linear programming computational approach of Torgovitsky (2019) (also known
as PIES2) to our framework. For a given value of the systematic match surplus, this method
changes the search over the space of infinite-dimensional cumulative distribution functions into a
search over a space of cumulative distribution functions evaluated at a finite number of points.
The latter search can be written as a simple linear programming problem. Further, note that the
analyst would need to solve the linear programming problem for every admissible value of the
systematic match surplus. Usually, in the partial identification literature, this is carried out by
generating a grid of points to approximate the parameter space and then repeating the exercise of
interest for each grid point. The difficulty of doing so increases with the size of the grid which, in
the 1to1TU model, increases exponentially with the cardinality of the covariates’ support, hence
leading quickly to a computational bottleneck. We solve this issue by showing that the parameter
space can be ex-ante partitioned into a finite number of subsets such that, for each subset, every
value belonging to that subset gives rise to the same linear programming problem. Therefore, the
analyst has to solve the linear programming problem only once for each subset.
In Section 6, we use our methodology to re-examine some of the relevant questions in the
empirical literature on the marriage market that have been previously answered by relying on the
Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model. A key question that stands out in this literature is whether ed-
ucational sorting (i.e., the tendency of agents to marry someone with similar or, alternatively, very
different education levels) has changed over time. Answering this question is important because
2That is, Partial Identification by Extending Subdistributions.
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educational sorting may have a crucial impact on inequality by determining family formation and
intergenerational transmission of human capital (Kremer, 1997; Fernández and Rogerson, 2001;
Fernández, Guner, and Knowles, 2005; Heckman and Mosso, 2014; Dupuy and Weber, 2019;
Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar, 2019; Chiappori, Costa-Dias, Crossman, and Meghir, 2020; Ciscato
and Weber, 2020).
Assessing changes in educational sorting is a difficult task because it requires us to disentangle
the effect of changes in the marginal probability distribution of education categories from potential
structural changes in the match surplus. In fact, men and especially women have become more
educated over time. Hence, people with similar education levels are mechanically more likely to
marry. We thus want to detect changes in educational sorting that occur in excess of changes
that would naturally occur because of such distributional variations in education.
The literature proposes two approaches to measure changes in educational sorting. The first
amounts to using indices of sorting which are based on comparing the empirical match probabilities
to a counterfactual world where matching happens randomly (Fernández and Rogerson, 2001;
Greenwood, Guner, and Kocharkov, 2003; Liu and Lu, 2006; Greenwood, et al., 2014; Abbott, et
al., 2019; Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar, 2019; Shen, 2019). The second amounts to using a structural
model of the marriage market, such as the 1to1TU model, to estimate individual preferences and
analyse how they change over time. The second approach has been implemented by Siow (2015),
Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017), and Chiappori, Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2020), based on
the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model.
Both approaches suggest that, on average, positive educational sorting has increased in the
U.S. in the past decades. However, there is some debate around this trend when we look closer
at each education category. For instance, Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar (2019) find that positive
educational sorting has declined among the highly educated and increased among the less edu-
cated. Instead, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) find that positive educational sorting has
increased in each education category, particularly among college graduates. Similar results are
obtained by Chiappori, Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2020). Note that while the conclusions achieved
via the structural approach have the advantages of explicitly linking the observed marital pat-
terns with the economic determinants of sorting, such findings may be driven by the Multinomial
Logit structure. We thus use our methodology to assess whether those conclusions are robust and
obtainable also under nonparametric assumptions on the taste shock distribution.
Using data from the American Community Survey between years 1940 and 1966, we implement
our methodology under three alternative and increasingly restrictive classes of nonparametric
assumptions on the taste shock distribution. We find that, up to year 1950, the 1to1TU model is
completely uninformative about the direction of educational sorting. The 1to1TU model starts
to unambiguously reveal the presence of positive educational sorting in year 1955 within some
education categories. In year 1966, the presence of positive educational sorting is confirmed within
every education category and seems especially evident within the most (least) educated fraction of
the population. Therefore, the 1to1TU model is progressively more informative over time about
4
the direction of educational sorting. However, we find no evidence that positive educational
sorting has increased (or decreased) over time within each education category, under any of the
three classes of distributional assumptions considered. This is because the estimated identified
intervals for the relevant structural parameters remain always unbounded on the right-hand-side.
This differs from the empirical findings of Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017), which are based
on the same data. Our results suggest that those findings may be driven by the Multinomial Logit
structure.
In Section 6, we consider another relevant question in the empirical literature on the marriage
market and obtain conclusions similar to the above. In particular, as discussed by Chiappori,
Iyigun, and Weiss (2009) and Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017), the increase in educational
sorting makes a higher stock of human capital more valuable on the marriage market. As a
consequence, they predict an increase in the expected maximum payoff an agent can receive in
the marriage market due to achieving a college degree (“marital college premium”), especially
among women. Their empirical findings corroborate such a prediction in the U.S., based on the
Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model. By contrast, the estimated identified sets do not show any
evidence that the marital college premium has increased over time, under any of the three classes
of nonparametric distributional assumption considered. Further, the 1to1TU model seems to be
particularly uninformative about the women’s side.
In what follows, Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 introduces the model, Section 4 dis-
cusses identification, Section 5 presents simulations, Section 6 describes the empirical applications,
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
This section reviews some related literature in addition to the references of Section 1.
Applications of the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model to the marriage market The
Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model has been introduced by Choo and Siow (2006) and since then has
become popular in the empirical research on the marriage market. Several papers use it to learn
whether matching preferences are positive assortative by age, education, geographical location,
etc. (Choo and Siow, 2006; Botticini and Siow, 2011; Bruze, Svarer, and Weiss, 2015; Choo, 2015;3
Siow, 2015; Galichon, Kominers, and Weber, 20194). Other papers use it to assess which of the
partner characteristics are complements/substitutes in the production of the systematic match
surplus and their relative strengths (Dupuy and Galichon, 2014;5 Ciscato, Galichon, Goussé,
2020).
3Bruze, Svarer, and Weiss (2015) and Choo (2015) incorporate dynamic aspects into the framework of Choo
and Siow (2006).
4Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2019) extend the framework of Choo and Siow (2006) to imperfectly trans-
ferable utilities.
5Dupuy and Galichon (2014) extend the framework of Choo and Siow (2006) to continuous covariates.
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The Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model has been frequently used to investigate the evolution
over time of the link between education levels and marriage market outcomes. In particular, the
existing literature has studied questions like how educational sorting in the marriage market has
changed over time (Siow, 2015; Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss, 2017; Chiappori, Costa-Dias, and
Meghir, 2020; Chiappori, Costa-Dias, Crossman, and Meghir, 2020) and how the marital college
premium has changed over time (Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss, 2009; Chiappori, Salanié, and
Weiss, 2017).
Other papers adopt the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model to measure the effect on marital
choices of exogenous events, changing the distribution of individual characteristics on each side of
the market, such as the famine in China between 1958 and 1961 (Brandt, Siow, and Carl, 2016).
The Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model is often incorporated into bigger structural models.
Examples of these include collective household models with marriage and labor supply (Choo and
Seitz, 2013); life cycle models of education, marriage, labor supply, and consumption (Chiappori,
Costa-Dias, and Meghir, 2018); collective household models with marriage, labor supply, home
production choices, and joint taxation (Gayle and Shephard, 20196); and collective household
models with marriage, fertility decisions, and child socialisation choices (Bisin and Tura, 2020).
Mourifié and Siow (2020) extend the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model to allow for peer effects
and cohabitation.
Note that, in all the papers cited above, the essence of the identification arguments pertaining
to marital choices exploits data on one large market.
Econometrics of the 1to1TU model Galichon and Salanié (2020) investigate identification
in the 1to1TU model when one dispenses with the Multinomial Logit structure of Choo and Siow
(2006). They show that the 1to1TU model is just identified (and, thus, the systematic match
surplus is point identified) with data on one large market under the assumption that the taste
shock distribution is fully known by the analyst. They also provide closed form expressions for the
systematic match surplus in the case of some parametric distributional families. Their findings
can allow one to introduce correlation among the taste shocks and conditional heteroskedastic-
ity. However, fully knowing the taste shock distribution requires either such distribution to be
parameter-free, or the analyst to fix the value of each parameter entering it, which can be ad hoc
and restrictive.
The existing literature offers three ways to introduce unknown parameters in the taste shock
distribution, so as to circumvent the exact identification result of Galichon and Salanié (2020),
while maintaining point identification. The first amounts to further parameterising the system-
atic match surplus in order to free some degrees of freedom.7 The second amounts to exploiting
variations of matching patterns across a few large cohorts which feature different distributions of
6Gayle and Shephard (2019) allow for imperfectly transferable utilities.
7Note that, in the 1to1TU model of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2020), the systematic
match surplus is already parameterised because the observed characteristics of agents are discrete.
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covariates, independent matching processes, identical systematic match surplus up to some drifts
or linear/quadratic trends, and identical taste shock distribution (Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss,
2017). The third amounts to exploiting variations of matching patterns across many i.i.d. markets
(Fox, 2010; Fox, 2018; Fox, Yang, and Hsu, 2018; Sinha, 2018), as in the empirical IO tradition.8
All three approaches are appealing because, by preserving point identification, they can offer pre-
cise answers to relevant policy questions. However, it is hard to gauge the robustness merits of
the first two approaches because they introduce unknown parameters in the taste shock distribu-
tion at the cost of further restricting other parts of the model. In particular, parameterising the
systematic match surplus (for instance, via a linear index) may not be desirable because it does
not necessarily translate into an analogous parameterisation of the equilibrium systematic payoffs
gained by each individual which, as we will see, are key objects for the identification analysis.
Also, restricting the evolution of the systematic match surplus across cohorts may be problematic
as the systematic match surplus evolves according to complicated underlying dynamics. Lastly,
the third approach can be difficult to implement practically because in most datasets it is unclear
as to what truly defines i.i.d. markets. For instance, the majority of the empirical applications
of the third approach assumes that consecutive years represent i.i.d. markets, which can be of-
ten hard to justify (Baccara, İmrohoroğlu, Wilson, and Yariv, 2012; Mindruda, 2013; Akkus,
Cookson, and Hortaçsu, 2016; Mindruda, Moeen, and Agarwal, 2016; Chen, 2017; Banal-Estañol,
Macho-Stadler, and Pérez-Castrillo, 2018).
Recent advances in the partial identification literature have pointed out an alternative route
to avoid parametric assumptions on the taste shock distribution, without adding any additional
restriction on the systematic match surplus, and while remaining within a one large market frame-
work. In particular, Graham (2011; 2013b) shows that if the taste shocks are i.i.d., then the signs
of some complementarities between the spouses’ observed characteristics are identified. Fox (2018)
bounds the systematic match surplus under the assumption that the taste shocks are exchange-
able across the observed characteristics of the potential partners. Our paper contributes to this
strand of the literature by constructing the identified set of the systematic match surplus without
requiring the taste shocks to be i.i.d. or exchangeable, which can both be strong assumptions.
Econometrics of partially identified models More generally, this paper is related to the
literature on partial identification in applied research (Ho and Rosen, 2017; Molinari, 2020). Fur-
ther, our approach can also be used to do a sensitivity analysis of the empirical findings obtained
under the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model. In fact, our methodology allows one to construct
the identified set of the systematic match surplus under increasingly restrictive nonparametric
assumptions on the taste shock distribution. Note that here we consider discrete relaxations
of the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model. Continuous relaxations of parametric distributional
assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity are studied by Christensen and Connault (2019).




This section describes the 1to1TU model that has been previously studied in Choo and Siow
(2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2020).
We refer to agents on one side of the market as men and to agents on the other side of the
market as women but the analysis is not restricted to the marriage market. The 1to1TU model
relies on four main assumptions which we outline in what follows.
Assumption 1. (Large market) There is a two-sided market. One side of the market is populated
by an uncountably infinite set of men, I, with measure dµ̃I . The other side is populated by an
uncountably infinite set of women, J , with measure dµ̃J . The two sides of the market are
stochastically independent. 
Assumption 2. (Finite number of observed types) Each man i ∈ I is characterised by a type,
Xi, with finite support, X . The mass of men of type x ∈ X is denoted by mx. Each woman
j ∈ J is characterised by a type, Yj, with finite support, Y . The mass of women of type y ∈ Y
is denoted by wy. Without loss of generality, we normalise the total mass of agents to 1, i.e.,∑
x∈X mx +
∑
y∈Y wy = 1. The realisations of Xi and Yj are observed by the researcher and all
agents. Lastly, we define the sets of partner types that are available to men and women by
Y0 ≡ Y ∪ {0} and X0 ≡ X ∪ {0}, respectively, where “0” represents the option to not match. 
Assumption 3. (Taste shocks) Each man i ∈ I is endowed with a |Y0|×1 vector of taste shocks,
εi ≡ (εiy ∀y ∈ Y0), where εiy denotes the idiosyncratic preference of man i for marrying a woman
of type y ∈ Y0. Conditional on Xi = x and for each x ∈ X , εi has cumulative distribution function
(hereafter, CDF) Fx. Fx is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and has
support in R|Y0|, where |Y0| denotes the cardinality of Y0. Each woman j ∈ J is endowed with a
|X0| × 1 vector of taste shocks, ηj ≡ (ηxj ∀x ∈ X0), where ηxj denotes the idiosyncratic preference
of woman j for marrying a man of type x ∈ X0. Conditional on Yj = y and for each y ∈ Y , ηj
has CDF Gy. Gy is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and has support
in R|X0|. The realisations of εi and ηj are not observed by the researcher. 
Assumption 4. (Separability) A match between man i ∈ I of type x ∈ X and woman j ∈ J of
type y ∈ Y generates a match surplus defined as
Φ̃ij ≡ Φxy + εiy + ηxj,
where Φ ≡ (Φxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X ×Y) is the systematic match surplus. The payoff of man i ∈ I from
remaining unmatched is
Φ̃i0 ≡ εi0.




Assumption 1 outlines the one large market framework, as discussed in Section 2. The restric-
tion on the stochastic independence of the two sides of the market is not crucial for our discussion
and can be relaxed.
Assumption 2 requires each agent to belong to one type. There are finite number of types,
which are defined by the Cartesian product of all the individual characteristics observed by the
researcher. Note that Assumption 2 does not rule out types being defined by multi-dimensional
covariates. However, we emphasise that most of the empirical applications on the marriage market
cited in Section 2 define types using only a one-dimensional covariate, such as education or age.
This is because, even in the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model, having types determined by multi-
dimensional covariates often leads to empirical match probabilities close to zero which can cause
identification issues. For the same reason, even in the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model, it is
desirable to consider X and Y with relatively small cardinalities.
Assumption 3 requires each agent to have idiosyncratic marital preferences over the types of
the potential partners and not over their identities. It implies that women (men) of the same type
are perfect substitutes for a man (woman).
Assumption 4 imposes that the match surplus is the sum of two components. One is the
systematic match surplus, that is determined by the types of the potential partners. The other
is the sum of the taste shocks of the potential partners. In particular, the latent heterogeneity
entering the match surplus equation does not consist of an ij-indexed term. Instead, it is modelled
through the sum of two terms, εiy + ηxj, each of which only depends on the type of the potential
partner. Assumption 4 is typically referred to as “separability”. For a thorough discussion of
Assumption 4, see Chiappori (2017).
A matching consists of
(i) A measure dµ̃ on the set I × J , such that the marginal of dµ̃ over I (J ) is dµ̃I (dµ̃J ).
(ii) A set of payoffs, {Ũi}i∈I and {Ṽj}j∈J , such that
Ũi + Ṽj = Φ̃ij ∀(i, j) ∈ supp(dµ̃).
(Chiappori, McCann, and Nesheim, 2010; Chiappori, McCann, and Pass, 2020). That is, a
matching consists of a match assignment and a match surplus sharing rule. A match assignment
is a description of who is matched with whom. A match surplus sharing rule tells us how the match
surplus is divided between spouses. Such division of the match surplus relies on endogenously
determined transfers, ensuring that every agent maximises her utility and the market clears.
A matching, dµ̃, {Ũi}i∈I , {Ṽj}j∈J , is stable when no agent has an incentive to change her
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partner, i.e.
Ũi ≥ Φ̃i0 ∀i ∈ I,
Ṽj ≥ Φ̃0j ∀j ∈ J ,
Ũi + Ṽj ≥ Φ̃ij ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J .
The first two sets of inequalities imply that married agents would not prefer being single. The
last set of inequalities states that no man and woman can get a strictly higher match surplus by
matching together than what they get under dµ̃. Lastly, it can be shown that a stable matching
exists under mild continuity assumptions (Villani, 2009). Moreover, in the limit of continuous
and atomless populations, the stable matching is generically unique (Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame,
1992). Importantly for the identification analysis, the resulting equilibrium mass of couples where
the man is of type x and the woman is of type y is unique for every (x, y). In what follows, we
denote this equilibrium mass of couples by
µxy ∀(x, y) ∈ Z ≡ X0 × Y0 \ {0, 0}.
4 Identification
Our discussion of identification is divided into five sections. In Section 4.1, we describe which
data are considered available to the researcher. In Section 4.2, we present the policy-relevant
parameters. In Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, we illustrate our identification arguments.
4.1 Data
We assume that the market of interest has already reached the stable matching. In other words, as
the analyst collects more data, the asymptotic fiction is that the researcher learns more about the
already established stable matching, without altering it. For identification, we assume that the
analyst knows {µxy}(x,y)∈Z , {mx}x∈X , and {wy}y∈Y . For estimation and inference, we will replace
{µxy}(x,y)∈Z , {mx}x∈X , and {wy}y∈Y with consistent sample analogues, resulting from sampling






denotes the equilibrium proportion of couples where the man is of type x and the woman is of








as the equilibrium probability of marrying a woman of type y ∈ Y0 conditional on being a man
of type x ∈ X , and the equilibrium probability of marrying a man of type x ∈ X0 conditional on
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as the proportion of men of type x ∈ X and the proportion of women of type y ∈ Y , respectively.
4.2 Structural parameters of interest
From an economic perspective, our main interest lies in recovering the systematic match surplus,
Φ. In fact, (partially) identifying Φ allows one to answer three important questions considered in
the marriage market literature.
First, Φ can be used to learn which of the spouses’ observed characteristics are comple-
ments/substitutes in the production of the systematic match surplus. For instance, suppose
that X collects r education levels and Y collects l income categories. Without loss of generality,
order the r education levels from lowest to highest and label them X ≡ {1, ..., r}. Similarly,
order the l income categories from lowest to highest and label them Y ≡ {1, ..., l}. For any
(x, y), (x̃, ỹ) ∈ X × Y with x > x̃ and y > ỹ, consider the cross-difference operator,
Dxy,x̃ỹ(Φ) ≡ Φxy + Φx̃ỹ − Φxỹ − Φx̃y. (1)
Dxy,x̃ỹ(Φ) measures how the incremental (dis)value of marrying a more-educated man evolves as
the income of the woman increases. Hence, the vector (Dxy,x̃ỹ(Φ) ∀(x, y), (x̃, ỹ) ∈ X×Y , x > x̃, y >
ỹ) captures the intensity of the complementarity/substitutability between a man’s education and a
woman’s income in the production of the systematic match surplus. Similar ideas can be extended
to the case where types are defined by the Cartesian product of multi-dimensional covariates.
Assessing complementarities/substitutabilities and their relative strengths is important to discover
the key drivers of the gains to matching. For a review of papers using the Multinomial Logit
1to1TU model to study complementarities/substitutabilities in marital decisions, see the first
paragraph of Section 2. Complementarities/substitutabilities are also central in the analysis of
Fox (2010) and Graham (2011; 2013b).
Second, complementarities are inherently related to the concept of positive assortativeness,
i.e., the tendency of agents to match with similar people. Investigating positive assortativeness
and its evolution over time has been a focus of empirical research since Becker (1973) because
it can be crucial to understand the sources of inequality in intergenerational outcomes. For
instance, if the education level of parents affects their children’s school attainment and marriage
is positively assortative by education, then inequality in the next generation may be higher. In
the 1to1TU model one can detect positive assortativeness within a given market and evaluate
changes in positive assortativeness across markets (for instance, across cohorts) by estimating the
supermodular core of Φ,
D(Φ) ≡ (Dxx,x̃x̃(Φ) ∀x, x̃ ∈ X , x > x̃), (2)
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within each market. If each component of the vector D(Φ) is positive, then there is positive
assortative matching. Further, if the components of the vector D(Φ) increase across markets,
then one can conclude that positive assortative matching increases across markets as well. For a
review of papers using the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model to study how positive assortativeness
in the marriage market has evolved over time, see the first paragraph of Section 2. Further details
and references are in Sections 1 and 6.
Third, Φ can be used to answer some normative welfare questions. For instance, as discussed
by Graham (2011; 2013b), Φ allows the analyst to characterise how alternative assignments (or
policies which cause re-assignments) alter the average systematic match surplus, while leaving the
availability of resources (i.e., {px}x∈X and {py}y∈Y) constant. In particular, the average realloca-
tion effect (ARE) of Graham, Imbens, and Ridder (2014) measures the impact of implementing
an alternative assignment, {paxy}(x,y)∈Z , on the average systematic match surplus relative to the





Alternative assignments of interest can be positive/negative assortative assignments and random
assignments. Computing the ARE for such alternative assignments can help to better evaluate
the consequences on welfare and inequality of the status-quo assignment. The efficiency of the
status-quo assignment can also be assessed by computing the maximum reallocation effect (MRE),
analysed by Bhattacharya (2009), which measures the maximum gain in the average systematic






For an empirical application of these ideas to the relationship between parental schooling and
children’s educational attainment, see Graham (2013c).
In addition to recovering Φ, our methodology also permits the analyst to (partially) identify
how Φ is shared between spouses. In particular, let Uxy be the part of Φxy that is gained by a man
of type x when matching with a woman of type y. Let Vxy be the part of Φxy that is gained by a
woman of type y when matching with a man of type x.9 Knowing U ≡ (Uxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X ×Y0) and
V ≡ (Vxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y) is useful to measure the impact of pre-marital decisions on marriage
market outcomes. For instance, consider the men’s side and suppose that X collects r education
levels, which are ordered from lowest to highest and labelled X ≡ {1, ..., r} with r indicating the
college degree. Let Ūx be the expected payoff that man i of type x ∈ X gets when marrying, i.e.,
Ūx ≡ EFx(max
y∈Y0
Uxy + εiy|Xi = x).
9Uxy and Vxy reappear below in Proposition 1.
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For any x̃ ∈ X with x̃ < x, the difference Ūx− Ūx̃ denotes the gain in expected utility obtained by
reaching education level x instead of x̃. Therefore, it represents the marital education premium.
When x = r, such a difference is called the marital college premium. These quantities have
received particular interest because they capture the value of human capital on the marriage
market (Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss, 2009; Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss, 2017). As shown in
Galichon and Salanié (2020), the marital education premium is equal to






py|x̃Ux̃y + EFx(εiy∗i |Xi = x)− EFx̃(εiỹ∗i |Xi = x̃), (3)
where y∗i ∈ Y0 is the optimal choice of man i of type x and ỹ∗i ∈ Y0 is the optimal choice of man i
of type x̃. Note from (3) that computing the marital education premium requires the specification
of {Fx}x∈X . Thus, our methodology is insufficient to compute the marital education premium.
Nevertheless, our methodology allows the analyst to evaluate quantities that contribute to the








which represents the change in the average systematic payoffs due to reaching education level x
instead of x̃. In turn, such bounds will help us make certain conclusions on Ūx − Ūx̃. Further
details are in our empirical application in Section 6. In what follows,
C(U) ≡ (Cxx̃(U) ∀x, x̃ ∈ X , x > x̃) and C(V ) ≡ (Cyỹ(V ) ∀y, ỹ ∈ Y , y > ỹ). (5)
4.3 Two multinomial choice models
Galichon and Salanié (2020) provide a key result for our identification analysis which relies on
the separability restriction stated in Assumption 4.10
Proposition 1. (Galichon and Salanié, 2020) Given the primitives Φ, {px}x∈X , {py}y∈Y , {Fx}x∈X ,
{Gy}y∈Y generating the stable matching dµ̃, {Ũi}i∈I , {Ṽj}j∈J , there exist vectors




(Uxy + εiy) ∀i ∈ I of type x ∈ X , ∀x ∈ X , (6)
Ṽj = max
x∈X0
(Vxy + ηxj) ∀j ∈ J of type y ∈ Y , ∀y ∈ Y , (7)
Uxy + Vxy = Φxy, Ux0 = 0, V0y = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y . (8)
10This result also appears in previous working paper versions of Galichon and Salanié (2020), in Chiappori,
Salanié, Tillman, and Weiss (2008), and in Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017).
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
Proposition 1 allows us to rewrite the framework of Section 3 as two separate one-sided multi-
nomial choice models linked by market-clearing transfers that are implicitly embedded into the
vectors U and V . Such an alternative representation of the problem is useful as it immediately
suggests a way to investigate the identification of Φ. That is, the researcher can study separate
identification of U and V from (6) and (7) using various restrictions on the unobserved hetero-
geneity, and then obtain identification results for Φ through (8).
Further, Galichon and Salanié (2020) prove that if {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y are fully known by
the analyst, then the 1to1TU model is just identified and, thus, Φ is point identified. Note that
fully knowing {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y requires either such conditional CDFs to be parameter-free,
or the analyst to fix the value of each parameter entering them. In particular, a widespread
practice in the empirical literature amounts to assuming that the taste shocks are i.i.d. stan-
dard Extreme Value Type I , independently distributed from types, so that Φ can be recovered
via standard Multinomial Logit arguments applied to each side of the market (Choo and Siow,
2006). As discussed in Sections 1 and 2, imposing a Multinomial Logit structure or, more gen-
erally, completely specifying {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y can be ad hoc and restrictive. Our objective
is examining the consequences on the identification of Φ when parametric assumptions on the
unobserved heterogeneity are relaxed.
4.4 The extent of under-identification
As shown by Galichon and Salanié (2020), if {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y are not assumed to be fully
known by the analyst, then the 1to1TU model is under-identified. As a first step, this section in-
vestigates the extent of under-identification by answering the following question: does the 1to1TU
model, with data on one large market, retain some identifying power on Φ without imposing any
restriction on {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y? Proposition 2 below claims that, in the absence of any re-
striction on {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y , the 1to1TU model is completely uninformative about Φ. That
is, for every possible value of Φ, there exist some {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y which when combined
with that value of Φ, rationalise the empirical conditional choice probabilities, {py|x}(x,y)∈X×Y0
and {px|y}(x,y)∈X0×Y .
Before presenting Proposition 2, we introduce some useful notation. Let U , V , and Θ denote
the parameter spaces of U , V , and Φ, respectively, i.e.,
U ≡ {(Uxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0) ∈ R|X×Y0| : Ux0 = 0 ∀x ∈ X},
V ≡ {(Vxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y) ∈ R|X0×Y| : V0y = 0 ∀y ∈ Y},
Θ ≡ R|X×Y|.
Further, let F and G be the function spaces of all admissible {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y , respectively.11
11Note that one element of F is a family of |X | conditional CDFs, {Fx}x∈X . Similarly, one element of G is a
14
Lastly, for any y ∈ Y0, U ∈ U , and {Fx}x∈X ∈ F , let κ(U, Fx, y) be the predicted probability of
marrying a woman of type y ∈ Y0 conditional on being a man of type x ∈ X , i.e.,
κ(U, Fx, y) ≡ λFx({(ey ∀y ∈ Y0) ∈ R|Y0| : Uxy + ey ≥ Uxỹ + eỹ ∀ỹ ∈ Y0 \ {y}}), (9)
where λFx is the measure associated with Fx. Similarly, for any x ∈ X0, V ∈ V , and {Gy}y∈Y ∈ G,
let κ(V,Gy, x) be the predicted probability of marrying a man of type x ∈ X0 conditional on being
a woman of type y ∈ Y , i.e.,
κ(V,Gy, x) ≡ λGy({(ex ∀x ∈ X0) ∈ R|X0| : Vxy + ex ≥ Vx̃y + ex̃ ∀x̃ ∈ X0 \ {x}}), (10)
where λGy is the measure associated with Gy.
Proposition 2. (Under-identification of Φ) Given Φ ∈ Θ, consider any (U, V ) ∈ U ×V such that
Uxy + Vxy = Φxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y . (11)
Then, there exist {Fx}x∈X ∈ F and {Gy}y∈Y ∈ G such that
py|x = κ(U, Fx, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0, (12)
px|y = κ(V,Gy, x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y . (13)

Proposition 2 makes it clear that one needs to impose some distributional restrictions on the
unobserved heterogeneity for the 1to1TU model to be potentially informative about Φ.12,13
4.5 Adding nonparametric assumptions on unobserved heterogeneity
In this section, we ask ourselves whether the 1to1TU model retains any identifying power on Φ
under various classes on nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogene-
ity, so as to still be able to address relevant policy matters while maintaining a certain degree
of robustness. To answer this question, we adopt a computational approach. In particular, we
start from observing that if {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y are not assumed to be fully known by the
analyst, then the 1to1TU model is under-identified and, in turn, Φ is partially identified. Hence,
we provide a methodology to practically construct the identified set of Φ under various classes of
nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity.
family of |Y| conditional CDFs, {Gy}y∈Y .
12Note that the point identification result in Galichon and Salanié (2020) establishes the converse of Proposition
2. That is, given Φ ∈ Θ, {Fx}x∈X ∈ F , and {Gy}y∈Y ∈ G, there exists (U, V ) ∈ U × V such that (11)-(13) are
satisfied.
13Note that Proposition 2 still holds even if we impose scale normalisations on U and V , as discussed in the proof
in Appendix A.1. Note also that appropriate location normalisations have been already imposed by Proposition
1, i.e., Ux0 = V0y for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
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Intuitively, the identified set of Φ is the set of values of Φ such that there exists U , V , {Fx}x∈X ,
and {Gy}y∈Y that satisfy (11)-(13). We denote it by Θ∗. Note that, by Proposition 1, we can
construct Θ∗ by separately focusing on each side of the market. In fact, first, we can construct
the identified set of U (hereafter, denoted by U∗), i.e., the set of values of U such that there exists
{Fx}x∈X that satisfies (12). Then, we can construct the identified set of V (hereafter, denoted by
V∗), i.e., the set of values of V such that there exists {Gy}y∈Y that satisfies (13). Finally, we can
obtain Θ∗ from (11). In what follows, we explain how to construct U∗. Similar arguments have
to be implemented for constructing V∗.
Recall that in multinomial choice models what matter are differences in utilities. Therefore,
as a preliminary step, we rewrite the identification problem using the taste shock differences.
Without loss of generality, we label the women’s types as Y ≡ {1, ..., r}. Let
∆εi ≡ (εi1 − εi0, ..., εir − εi0, εi1 − εi2, ..., εi1 − εir, εi2 − εi3, ..., εi2 − εir, ..., εir−1 − εir), (14)






We highlight three important facts. First, each {Fx}x∈X ∈ F determines a corresponding
family of d-dimensional conditional CDFs of ∆εi, which we denote by {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F . Second,
the first r components of ∆εi can be arbitrary, while the remaining (d− r) components are linear
combination of the first r components. Hence, for every x ∈ X , ∆Fx has support contained in
the region
B ≡ {(b1, b2, ..., bd) ∈ Rd : br+1 = b1 − b2, br+2 = b1 − b3, ..., b2r−1 = b1 − br,
b2r = b2 − b3, ..., b3r−3 = b2 − br, ...,
bd = br−1 − br}.
Third, for each (x, y) ∈ X × Y0, the function κ(U, Fx, y) defined in (9) can be equivalently
expressed, with slight abuse of notation, by using ∆Fx in place of Fx. In light of these three facts
and for a given U ∈ U , verifying whether there exists {Fx}x∈X ∈ F solving (12) is equivalent to
verifying whether
∃ {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F s.t. py|x = κ(U,∆Fx, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0 and λ∆Fx(B) = 1 ∀x ∈ X ,
where λ∆Fx is the measure associated with ∆Fx.
Moreover, one may want to impose various nonparametric restrictions on {∆Fx}x∈X in order
to obtain informative bounds on U (and, ultimately, Φ), as discussed above. We denote by
∆F † ⊂ ∆F the restricted collection of families of conditional CDFs. We describe later which
classes of nonparametric restrictions on {∆Fx}x∈X are considered.
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Thus, to sum up, our objective is to construct the identified set of U , defined as
U∗ ≡ {U ∈ U : ∃ {∆Fx}x∈X ∈∆F † s.t.
py|x = κ(U,∆Fx, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0 and λ∆Fx(B) = 1 ∀x ∈ X}.
We organise the discussion in three steps discussed in Sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2, and 4.5.3, respec-
tively. For any given U ∈ U , in Section 4.5.1 we explain how to verify whether there exists
{∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F † such that py|x = κ(U,∆Fx, y) for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y0. In Section 4.5.2,
we provide a result which reduces the computational burden of repeating the first step for every
U ∈ U . In Section 4.5.3, we explain how to impose the condition λ∆Fx(B) = 1 for every x ∈ X ,
which we call the degeneracy condition.
Lastly, we introduce some useful notation adopted in the forthcoming arguments. R̄ denotes
the extended real line. 0d is the d×1 vector of zeros. ∆εi,l is the l-th component of ∆εi and ∆Fx,l
is the l-th marginal of ∆Fx, where l ∈ {1, ..., d}. ∆εyi is the (r− 1)× 1 subvector of ∆εi collecting
the taste shock differences that are relevant when choosing y ∈ Y0. For instance, consider r = 2
(and, hence, d = 3). When choosing 0, man i evaluates εi1 − εi0 and εi2 − εi0. Thus, given the
definition of ∆εi in (14), ∆ε0i ≡ (εi1 − εi0, εi2 − εi0). Similarly, ∆ε1i ≡ (εi1 − εi0, εi1 − εi2) and
∆ε2i ≡ (εi2 − εi0, εi1 − εi2). We denote by ∆F yx the distribution of ∆ε
y
i conditional on Xi = x,
which can be obtained by appropriately marginalising ∆Fx.
4.5.1 First step
As part of the construction of U∗, the analyst has to find whether, for any given U ∈ U ,
∃ {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F † s.t. py|x = κ(U,∆Fx, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0. (15)
Without parametric restrictions on the agents’ unobserved heterogeneity, (15) is an infinite-
dimensional existence problem. We use Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky (2019) to transform (15) into
a linear programming problem. Essentially, the theorem states that, under various classes of
nonparametric restrictions on {∆Fx}x∈X , verifying (15) is equivalent to finding whether a linear
system has at least one solution. In what follows, we provide an intuition of the theorem and
the list of nonparametric restrictions on {∆Fx}x∈X that are considered in our simulations and
empirical application. We give a more formal statement of the theorem in Appendix B.
For simplicity, let r = 2 (hence, d = 3) and ∆F † = ∆F , so that (15) can be more explicitly
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rewritten as14
∃ {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F s.t.
p1|x = 1 + ∆Fx(−Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆Fx(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆Fx(−Ux1,∞,∞) ∀x ∈ X ,
p2|x = ∆Fx(∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆Fx(∞,−Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1) ∀x ∈ X ,
p0|x = ∆Fx(−Ux1,−Ux2,∞) ∀x ∈ X .
(16)
Note that, for every x ∈ X , (16) depends on the values of ∆Fx at a finite number of 3-tuples.
We collect such 3-tuples in the following three sets:
Ax,1,U ≡ {−Ux1,∞,−∞},
Ax,2,U ≡ {−Ux2,∞,−∞},
Ax,3,U ≡ {Ux2 − Ux1,∞,−∞},
where Ax,1,U collects the elements at which ∆Fx is evaluated along the first dimension, Ax,2,U
collects the elements at which ∆Fx is evaluated along the second dimension, and Ax,3,U collects
the elements at which ∆Fx is evaluated along the third dimension. We add −∞ to each set
because the value of one-dimensional CDFs at −∞ is known and equal to 0 by definition. Lastly,
we define Ax,U ≡ Ax,1,U ×Ax,2,U ×Ax,3,U . Thus, (16) can be equivalently written as
∀x ∈ X , ∃ ∆F̄Ux : Ax,U → R s.t.
p1|x = 1 + ∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞,∞), (17)
p2|x = ∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (∞,−Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1), (18)
p0|x = ∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,−Ux2,∞), (19)
and {∆F̄Ux }x∈X can be “extended” to a proper family of conditional CDFs in ∆F . (20)
(17)-(20) reveal that verifying (16) is equivalent to first finding whether a system of 3 linear
equations, (17)-(19), has a solution with respect to the finite-domain function ∆F̄Ux , and second
ensuring that such a solution can be extended to a proper conditional CDF as required by (20),
for every x ∈ X .
Using fundamental results in copula theory, in particular Sklar’s Theorem, it can be shown
that verifying whether ∆F̄Ux can be extended to a proper conditional CDF amounts to checking
14See Appendix C for details.
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if it satisfies the following linear system:
∆F̄Ux (−∞, t, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,2,U ×Ax,3,U , (21)
∆F̄Ux (t,−∞, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1,U ×Ax,3,U , (22)
∆F̄Ux (t, q,−∞) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1,U ×Ax,2,U , (23)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞,∞) = 1, (24)
0 ≤ ∆F̄Ux (t, q, r) ≤ 1 ∀(t, q, r) ∈ Ax,U , (25)
[−∆F̄Ux (t, q, r) + ∆F̄Ux (t′, q, r) + ∆F̄Ux (t, q′, r)−∆F̄Ux (t′, q′, r)+
∆F̄Ux (t, q, r′)−∆F̄Ux (t′, q, r′)−∆F̄Ux (t, q′, r′) + ∆F̄Ux (t′, q′, r′)] ≥ 0
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax,U
s.t. (t, q, r) ≤ (t′, q′, r′). (26)
Specifically, bearing in mind the properties defining CDFs, (21)-(24) ensure that ∆F̄Ux is equal to
0 when at least one of its arguments is −∞ and equal to 1 when all its arguments are ∞. (25)
guarantees that the range of ∆F̄Ux is a subset of [0, 1]. (26) requires ∆F̄Ux to be a 3-increasing
function, i.e., for each pair of 3-tuples in Ax,U which are comparable, (t, q, r) and (t′, q′, r′), the
volume of the 3-dimensional box with vertices from {t, t′}×{q, q′}×{r, r′} is positive. Further, if
∆F̄Ux satisfies (26), then it is called a 3-dimensional subdistribution. By merging (17)-(19) with
(21)-(26), a simple linear programming problem is obtained in which we must verify feasibility
with respect to {∆F̄Ux }x∈X .
The above methodology remains valid under various classes of nonparametric restrictions on
{∆Fx}x∈X , which can be simply imposed on {∆F̄Ux }x∈X as linear constraints. In particular, in our
simulations and empirical application, we will consider the following restrictions (not necessarily
all maintained simultaneously):
Assumption 5. (Nonparametric assumptions on {∆Fx}x∈X )
5.1. ∆εi is independent of Xi, i.e.,
∆Fx(a) = ∆Fx̃(a) ∀a ∈ R̄d, ∀x, x̃ ∈ X .
5.2. Conditional on Xi and for each l ∈ {1, ..., d}, ∆εi,l has a distribution symmetric at 0, i.e.,
∆Fx,l(a) + ∆Fx,l(−a) = 1 ∀a ∈ R̄, ∀x ∈ X .
5.3. Conditional on Xi, {∆εi,l}l∈{1,...,d} are identically distributed, i.e.,
∆Fx,l(a) = ∆Fx,l̃(a) ∀a ∈ R̄, ∀l, l̃ ∈ {1, ..., d}, ∀x ∈ X .
5.4. Conditional on Xi, {∆εyi }y∈Y0 are identically distributed, i.e.,
∆F yx (a) = ∆F ỹx (a) ∀a ∈ R̄r−1, ∀y, ỹ ∈ Y0, ∀x ∈ X .
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5.5. Conditional on Xi, ∆εi has a distribution with median zero, i.e.,
∆Fx(0d) =
1
2 ∀x ∈ X .

We refer the reader to Assumption A in Torgovitsky (2019) (which we also report in Appendix
B) for other nonparametric distributional assumptions on the taste shock differences that can
be accommodated. Finally, we remark that the above methodology does not allow to impose
nonparametric assumptions directly on the conditional CDFs of the original taste shocks, i.e., on
{Fx}x∈X . Given that in multinomial choice models what matters are differences in utilities (and
not absolute levels), this is the price we pay for having an approach that flexibly works under
several classes of nonparametric distributional restrictions.
4.5.2 Second step
As part of the construction of U?, the analyst has to verify the feasibility with respect to {∆F̄Ux }x∈X
of the linear programming problem described in Section 4.5.1 for every U ∈ U . Typically, this is
done in the partial identification literature by constructing a grid of points to approximate U , and
then repeating the exercise of interest for each grid point. The difficulty of implementing such an
approach increases with the size of the grid, which in turn, increases exponentially with r, hence
quickly leading to a computational bottleneck. In what follows, we give a characterisation of U
so that the issue of verifying feasibility for every U ∈ U is reduced to verifying feasibility for a
handful of U ∈ U . We first provide an intuition of the result and then a more formal statement.
For simplicity, let r = 2 and ∆F † = ∆F , as in Section 4.5.1. The only piece of the linear pro-
gramming problem of Section 4.5.1 that might induce different feasibility sets for different values
of U is (26), which requires the function ∆F̄Ux to be 3-increasing. This is because different values
of U might generate different pairs of comparable 3-tuples in Ax,U and, in turn, 3-dimensional
boxes with vertices located at different positions (in other words, “differently ordered”) in Rd.
Such observation immediately suggests that if two values of U generate pairs of 3-tuples in Ax,U
that are “similarly ordered” in Rd, then they should lead to the same constraints on ∆F̄Ux of the
type (26). In turn, if this holds ∀x ∈ X , then the linear programming problems for such two
values of U should have the same feasibility set.
We now explain what is meant by “similarly ordered”. Recall the definition of sets Ax,1,U ,
Ax,2,U , Ax,3,U , and Ax,U in Section 4.5.1. For every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, list the 3 elements of Ax,l,U in a
column vector, αx,l,U , so that
αx,1,U ≡ (−Ux1,∞,−∞)>, αx,2,U ≡ (−Ux2,∞,−∞)>, αx,3,U ≡ (Ux2 − Ux1,∞,−∞)>.
Similarly, list the twenty-seven 3-tuples of set Ax,U in a 27 × 3 matrix, αx,U , which we report
in Appendix C. Lastly, list the 27 elements of the image set of ∆F̄Ux in a column vector, fx,U .
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Consider any U, Ũ in U . Note that, for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, both αx,l,U and αx,l,Ũ have the smallest
element listed in the third row, the biggest element listed in the second row, and the intermediate
element listed in the first row, for every x ∈ X . This implies that the rows of αx,U that are
comparable in the sense of (26) have the same row-indices as the comparable rows of αx,Ũ , for
every x ∈ X . Therefore, the rows of fx,U which are restricted by (26) have the same row indices as
the restricted rows of fx,Ũ , for every x ∈ X . As a result, the feasible set of the linear programming
for U is equal to that for Ũ .
The above idea can be generalised as follows. For each l ∈ {1, ..., d}, let k denote the cardinality
of Ax,l,U . Let Π1 be the set of all possible permutations without repetition of {1, ..., k} and let
Π2 ≡ {<,=}k−1. Lastly, let
π : R̄k → Π1 × Π2,
where
π(α) ≡ (π1(α), π2(α)), ∀α ∈ R̄k.
In particular, π1(α) sorts the k elements of α from smallest to largest and reports their posi-
tions in the original vector. π2(α) reports the relational operators, < or =, among the sorted
elements of α. When α contains multiple elements with the same value, then we can adopt any
convention on which element to sort first. We call π(α) the “π-ordering” of α. For instance,
suppose α = (100, 99,∞). Then, π(α) = {(2, 1, 3), (<,<)}. Suppose α = (5, 5,−∞). Then,
π(α) = {(3, 2, 1), (<,=)}. By following arguments similar to those outlined in the previous para-
graph, it can be shown that if U, Ũ in U have the same π-ordering for every l ∈ {1, ..., d} and
x ∈ X , then the feasible set of the linear programming for U is equal to the feasible set of the
linear programming for Ũ . Proposition 3 summarises such a finding.
Proposition 3. (Simplifying grid search over U) Let ∆F † satisfy any of the restrictions listed
in Assumption 5. Take any U, Ũ in U such that π(αx,l,U) = π(αx,l,Ũ) for every l ∈ {1, ..., d} and
x ∈ X . Then,
∃ {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F † s.t. py|x = κ(U,∆Fx, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
if and only if
∃ {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F † s.t. py|x = κ(Ũ ,∆Fx, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0.

Remark A.1 in Appendix A explains how Proposition 3 is implemented in practice.
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4.5.3 Third step
Recall from Section 4.5 that the analyst has to ensure that {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F †, that solves py|x =
κ(U,∆Fx, y) for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y0, has support contained in the region B, i.e.,
λ∆Fx(B) = 1 ∀x ∈ X . (27)
We start with providing an equivalent characterisation of (27) in terms of zero measure conditions
on boxes in Qd, where Q ⊂ R is the set of rational numbers. The underlying intuition is that
if λ∆Fx(B) = 1, then any d-dimensional box in Rd not intersecting the region B has probability
measure zero. Conversely, it is sufficient to impose such a zero probability measure condition for
all the d-dimensional boxes in Qd not intersecting the region B to satisfy λ∆Fx(B) = 1.
Proposition 4. (Degeneracy condition) For any (b̂, b̃) ∈ R2, consider the d-dimensional boxes in
Rd
Bt,p,q(b̂, b̃) ≡ {(z1, ..., zd) ∈ Rd: zt > b̂+ b̃, zp ≤ b̂, zq ≤ b̃},
and
Qt,p,q(b̂, b̃) ≡ {(z1, ..., zd) ∈ Rd: zt ≤ b̂+ b̃, zp > b̂, zq > b̃},
∀t ∈ {1, ..., r− 1} and ∀(p, q) ∈ {(t+ 1, r+ 1), (t+ 2, r+ 2), ..., (r, d)}. For each {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F †
and x ∈ X ,
λ∆Fx(Bt,p,q(b̂, b̃)) = λ∆Fx(Qt,p,q(b̂, b̃)) = 0,
∀t ∈ {1, ..., r − 1}, ∀(p, q) ∈ {(t+ 1, r + 1), (t+ 2, r + 2), ..., (r, d)},∀(b, b̃) ∈ Q2,
(28)
if and only if λ∆Fx(B) = 1. 
We add two key remarks. First, (28) can be more explicitly rewritten using ∆Fx. For instance,
if r = 2, then (28) is equivalent to
∆Fx(∞, b̂, b̃)−∆Fx(b̂+ b̃, b̂, b̃) = 0,
∆Fx(b̂+ b̃,∞,∞)−∆Fx(b̂+ b̃, b̂,∞)−∆Fx(b̂+ b̃,∞, b̃) + ∆Fx(b̂+ b̃, b̂, b̃) = 0,
(29)
where both equations are linear in ∆Fx.15 Second, given our first remark, (28) constitutes a
countably infinite number of equations that are linear in ∆Fx. As such, we cannot incorporate all
of them in the linear programming problem of Section 4.5.1. To operationalise (28), we suggest to
consider only a finite number of 2-tuples, (b, b̃), from Q2. In practice, this means that the obtained
identified set is an outer set of the sharp one. It can be made arbitrarily close to being sharp
by considering an arbitrarily large number of 2-tuples, depending on the available computational
resources. In our simulations and empirical application, we have drawn such 2-tuples at random.
We have also constructed the identified set while considering various numbers of 2-tuples and
15See Appendix C for details.
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obtained negligible differences among the resulting regions.
In Appendix D, we provide an example of a linear programming problem which lists all the
conditions in Section 4.5.1 and Section 4.5.3.
5 Simulations
In this section, we implement the methodology described in Section 4.5 using simulated data. In
order to ensure that the volume of our identified set is not improperly inflated relative to the
point identified case, we impose some scale normalisations.16 In particular, when Assumption 5.1
(independence between ∆εi and Xi) is not imposed, we divide each of {Uxy}y∈Y by |Ux1| for every
x ∈ X and each of {Vxy}x∈X by |V1y| for every y ∈ X . Hence, the scale normalisations are
Ux1 ∈ {−1, 1} ∀x ∈ X and V1y ∈ {−1, 1} ∀y ∈ Y . (30)
Instead, when Assumption 5.1 is imposed, we divide each element of U by |U11| and each element
of V by |V11|. Hence, the scale normalisations are
U11 ∈ {−1, 1} and V11 ∈ {−1, 1}. (31)
We refer the reader to Appendix E.1 for a thorough discussion of (30) and (31).
As a first exercise, we investigate the identifying power of the 1to1TU model when we consider
various combinations of the distributional restrictions listed in Assumption 5. In particular, we
fix X = Y ≡ {1, ..., r} with r = 2, Φtrue11 = Φtrue22 = 4, and Φtrue12 = Φtrue21 = 1, where the superscript
“true” highlights the true parameter values. We simulate data under three DGPs, which differ in
{px}x∈X , {py}y∈Y , {Fx}x∈X , and {Gy}y∈Y :
(DGP1) {εiy}y∈Y0 are i.i.d., where εiy is distributed independently from Xi, as standard Extreme
Value Type I . The proportion of men of type 1 is 1/2. Analogous assumptions are imposed
on the women’s side.
(DGP2) εi is distributed independently of Xi as a normal mixture, with 2 equally weighted
components. The mean and variance-covariance matrix of each mixture component are
reported in Appendix E.2. Analogous assumptions are imposed on {Gy}y∈Y . The proportion
of men of type 1 is 1/6. The proportion of women of type 1 is 1/5.
(DGP3) εi is distributed as a normal mixture, with 2 equally weighted components, whose
variance-covariance matrix varies across x ∈ X . The mean and variance-covariance ma-
16Note that appropriate location normalisations have been already imposed by Proposition 1, i.e., Ux0 = V0y = 0
for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
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trix of each mixture component are reported in Appendix E.2. The proportion of men of
type 1 is 1/2. Analogous assumptions are imposed on the women’s side.
We emphasise that, in each of the three DGPs above, if {Fx}x∈X and {Gy}y∈Y are assumed to
be fully known by the analyst, then U , V , and Φ are point identified, as shown by Galichon and
Salanié (2020). We consider the seven specifications of distributional assumptions summarised
in Table 1. In Table 2, we report the true values and the identified sets of U , V , and Φ under






Table 1: Assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity maintained in the different specifications.
the three DGPs above and for each specification of Table 1.17 We also report the true values
and the identified sets of D22,11(Φ), C21(U), and C21(V ), defined in Section 4.2. Moreover, we
report the values of U , V , Φ, D22,11(Φ), C21(U), and C21(V ) that are recovered by using the
Multinomial Logit formulas of Choo and Siow (2006) (hereafter, CS values). We distinguish
between the case when Assumption 5.1 is imposed (“w/ 5.1”) and the case when Assumption
5.1 is not imposed (“w/o 5.1”) because, as highlighted by (30) and (31), these two cases entail
different scale normalisations.18 Further, note that the true values and the CS values of U , V , Φ,
D22,11(Φ), C21(U), and C21(V ) that are reported in Table 2 are also normalised according to (30)
and (31), in order to ensure that they belong to our identified sets. For instance, the normalised








and, hence, may be different from the
non-normalised true value, Φtrue22 = 4. Lastly, note that in DGP3 we do not consider specifications
[1] and [2] of Table 1. This is because DGP3 features conditional heteroskedasticity and, hence,
[1] and [2] would be misspecified.
We highlight a few facts. First, in each of the three DGPs considered, specifications [5], [6],
and [7] deliver the tightest bounds for U , V , Φ, C21(U), and C21(V ). Moreover, specifications
[5], [6], and [7] generate numerically identical bounds. Also specifications [3] and [4] generate
numerically identical bounds.
Second, in none of the cases considered, the identified set ofD22,11(Φ) is bounded on both sides.
This is because, there is always at least one component of Φ whose identified set is unbounded on
at least one side. In particular, under DGP1 and DGP3, the upper bound of D22,11(Φ) is always
∞ because the upper bound of U22 or V22 is always ∞.
Third, in DGP1 and DGP3 the sign of D22,11(Φ) is recovered unambiguously most of the times.
Instead, in DGP2, the sign of D22,11(Φ) is never identified. As discussed in Section 4.2, detecting
17To compute U true and V true under DGP2 and DGP3, we use the formula provided by Proposition 2 in Galichon
and Salanie (2020). More details are in Appendix E.3.
18Consequently, the corresponding identified sets are not necessarily nested.
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the sign of D22,11(Φ) is important in itself because it reveals the direction of assortativeness.
Graham (2011; 2013b) shows that if the taste shocks are i.i.d., then the sign of D22,11(Φ) is
identified. Our simulations highlight that i.i.d.-ness is not a necessary condition.
Fourth, in none of the cases considered, the identified sets of C21(U) and C21(V ) are bounded
on both sides. In particular, under DGP1 and DGP3, the upper bound of C21(U) and C21(V )
is always ∞ because the upper bound of U22 and V22 is always ∞. If types represent education
levels, such a result reveals that the identified set of the marital education premium will also be
unbounded on at least one side (see Equation (3)).
Fifth, note that in DGP1 and DGP3 the signs of C21(U) and C21(V ) are recovered unambigu-
ously under specifications [5], [6], and [7]. Instead, in DGP2, the signs of C21(U) and C21(V ) are
never identified.
Further, DGP1 and DGP3 produce identified sets of U , V , Φ, and D22,11(Φ) that are identical.
This is because DGP1 and DGP3 generate very similar empirical match probabilities.
Lastly, in DGP2 and DGP3 the assumption that the taste shocks are i.i.d. standard Extreme
Value Type I is misspecified. This implies that the CS values are different, sometimes quite sig-
nificantly, from the true values of U , V , Φ, D22,11(Φ), C21(U), and C21(V ). Nevertheless, the
CS values always belong to our identified sets. This is by construction, because the collections of
conditional CDFs contemplated by the specifications in Table 1 include the Extreme Value family.
As a second exercise, we investigate how the identifying power of the 1to1TU model varies as the
number of types increases. In particular, we simulate data under three DGPs, featuring r = 3,
r = 4, and r = 5 for both sides of the market, respectively. In each DGP, {εiy}y∈Y0 are i.i.d.,
where εiy is distributed independently from Xi, as standard Extreme Value Type I . Types are
represented in equal proportions. Φxx = 4 and Φxx̃ = 1 for every x, x̃ ∈ X . In Tables 3 and 4, we
report the normalised true values and the identified sets of U , V , Φ, D(Φ), C(U), and C21(V ),
under such three DGPs and for specifications [5] and [6] of Table 1.
Overall, the findings of Table 2 are confirmed. We highlight a few additional facts. First,
differently from Table 2, here specification [6] leads to bounds tighter than those produced by
specification [5] in some cases. For instance, see the identified set of U13 when r = 3.
Second, in none of the cases considered, the identified sets of D(Φ), C(U), and C(V ) are
bounded on both sides. Most of the times, we recover unambiguously the signs of the D(Φ)’s
components under specification [6]. We identify the signs of the C(U) and C(V )’s components
less often. In fact, in many cases (in all cases for r = 5), the identified sets of C(U) and C(V ) are
unbounded on both sides.
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True & CS 1 0.3062 0.1761 0.8674 1 0.2226 0.2764 0.9595 2 0.5289 0.4525 1.8269 2.8456 −0.1399 −0.0427
[1] {−1, 1} (−∞,∞) (−∞, 0.9] (−∞,∞) {−1, 1} (−∞, 0.9] (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) {−2, 2} (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
[2] 1 (−∞, 0.9] (−∞, 0.9] [0.1,∞) 1 (−∞, 0.9] (−∞, 0.9] [0.1,∞) 2 (−∞, 1.8] (−∞, 1.8] [0.2,∞) [0.4,∞) [−4.1048,∞) [−4.0832,∞)
w/o 5.1
DGP1
True & CS 1 0.3062 1 4.9262 1 1 0.2764 4.3103 2 1.3062 1.2764 9.2365 8.6539 2.9329 2.5393
[3] 1 (−∞, 0.8] {−1, 1} [0.2,∞) 1 {−1, 1} (−∞, 0.8] [0.2,∞) 2 (−∞, 1.8] (−∞, 1.8] [0.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [−0.8987,∞) [−0.8872,∞)
[4] 1 (−∞, 0.8] {−1, 1} [0.2,∞) 1 {−1, 1} (−∞, 0.8] [0.2,∞) 2 (−∞, 1.8] (−∞, 1.8] [0.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [−0.8987,∞) [−0.8872,∞)
[5] 1 [−0.8, 0.8] 1 [1.2,∞) 1 1 [−0.8, 0.8] [1.2,∞) 2 (0.2, 1.8] (0.2, 1.8] [2.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [0.1530,∞) [0.1724,∞)
[6] 1 [−0.8, 0.8] 1 [1.2,∞) 1 1 [−0.8, 0.8] [1.2,∞) 2 (0.2, 1.8] (0.2, 1.8] [2.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [0.1530,∞) [0.1724,∞)
[7] 1 [−0.8, 0.8] 1 [1.2,∞) 1 1 [−0.8, 0.8] [1.2,∞) 2 (0.2, 1.8] (0.2, 1.8] [2.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [0.1530,∞) [0.1724,∞)
w/ 5.1
DGP2
True 1 1.0432 −0.3448 0.3055 1 −2.0792 1.1369 1.8940 2 −1.0360 0.7921 2.1994 4.4433 −0.7357 0.1682
CS 1 2.0198 −0.1766 1.8872 1 −0.7420 3.3497 3.4288 2 1.2778 3.1731 5.3160 2.8651 −0.2050 0.0470
[1] {−1, 1} (−∞,∞) (−∞, 0.8] (−∞,∞) {−1, 1} (−∞, 0.8] (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) {−2, 2} (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
[2] {−1, 1} [0.2,∞) (−∞, 0.8] [0.2,∞) {−1, 1} (−∞, 0.8] [0.2,∞) [0.2,∞) {−2, 2} (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) [0.4,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
w/o 5.1
DGP2
True 1 1.0432 −1 0.8860 1 −1 1.1369 0.9109 2 0.0432 0.1369 1.7969 3.6167 −0.4340 −0.4052
CS 1 2.0198 −1 10.6845 1 −1 3.3497 4.6213 2 1.0198 2.3497 15.3058 13.9364 5.7047 0.8688
[3] {−1, 1} [0.5,∞) {−1, 1} [0.5,∞) {−1, 1} {−1, 1} [0.5,∞) [0.5,∞) {−2, 2} (−0.5,∞) [−0.5,∞) [1,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
[4] {−1, 1} [0.5,∞) {−1, 1} [0.5,∞) {−1, 1} {−1, 1} [0.5,∞) [0.5,∞) {−2, 2} (−0.5,∞) [−0.5,∞) [1,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
[5] 1 [1.01,∞) −1 [1,∞) 1 −1 [1.01,∞) [1,∞) 2 [0.01,∞) [0.01,∞) [2,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
[6] 1 [1.01,∞) −1 [1,∞) 1 −1 [1.01,∞) [1,∞) 2 [0.01,∞) [0.01,∞) [2,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
[7] 1 [1.01,∞) −1 [1,∞) 1 −1 [1.01,∞) [1,∞) 2 [0.01,∞) [0.01,∞) [2,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
w/o 5.1
DGP3
True 1 0.4464 1 2.9478 1 1 0.1981 2.2425 2 1.4464 1.1981 5.1903 4.5458 1.5016 1.0546
CS 1 0.0543 1 10.2726 1 1 0.0058 7.0958 2 1.0543 1.0058 17.3684 17.3083 6.7941 4.5653
[3] 1 (−∞, 0.8] {−1, 1} [0.2,∞) 1 {−1, 1} (−∞, 0.8] [0.2,∞) 2 (−∞, 1.8] (−∞, 1.8] [0.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [−0.8275,∞) [−0.8243,∞)
[4] 1 (−∞, 0.8] {−1, 1} [0.2,∞) 1 {−1, 1} (−∞, 0.8] [0.2,∞) 2 (−∞, 1.8] (−∞, 1.8] [0.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [−0.8275,∞) [−0.8243,∞)
[5] 1 [−0.8, 0.8] 1 [1.2,∞) 1 1 [−0.8, 0.8] [1.2,∞) 2 [0.2, 1.8] [0.2, 1.8] [2.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [0.1960,∞) [0.2105,∞)
[6] 1 [−0.8, 0.8] 1 [1.2,∞) 1 1 [−0.8, 0.8] [1.2,∞) 2 [0.2, 1.8] [0.2, 1.8] [2.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [0.1960,∞) [0.2105,∞)
[7] 1 [−0.8, 0.8] 1 [1.2,∞) 1 1 [−0.8, 0.8] [1.2,∞) 2 [0.2, 1.8] [0.2, 1.8] [2.4,∞) [0.8,∞) [0.1960,∞) [0.2105,∞)
Table 2: Projections of the identified sets of U , V , Φ, D22,11(Φ), C21(U), and C21(V ) in the first simulation exercise.
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r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
Parameters True & CS [5] [6] True & CS [5] [6] True & CS [5] [6]
U11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
U12 0.2668 [−0.8, 0.8] [−0.8, 0.6] 0.2774 [−0.6, 0.8] [−0.6, 0.8] 0.3218 [−0.7, 0.4] [−0.7, 0.4]
U13 0.2775 [−0.6, 2.6] [−0.6, 0.8] 0.2060 [−0.8, 0.6] [−0.8, 0.6] 0.2354 (−∞, 0.4] (−∞,−0.4]
U14 0.2292 [−0.6, 2.2] [−0.6, 2.2] 0.2878 [−0.7, 3.8] [−0.7, 3.8]
U15 0.2878 [−0.7, 3.8] [−0.7, 3.8]
U21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 {−1, 1} {−1, 1}
U22 3.8223 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 3.4317 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 6.8110 [2.3,∞] [2.3,∞]
U23 1.0129 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 1 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.3883 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
U24 1.0695 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 1 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
U25 1.3587 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
U31 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 {−1, 1} {−1, 1}
U32 1.0204 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 1.0881 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 1.1246 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
U33 5.3120 [1.4,∞) [1.4,∞) 4.2173 [1.4,∞) [1.4,∞) 3.7145 [2.1,∞) [2.1,∞)
U34 1 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.8665 (−∞, 5.8] (−∞, 5.8]
U35 0.8102 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
U41 1 1 1 1 1 1
U42 0.9144 [−0.8, 0.8] [−0.8, 0.8] 1.1770 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
U43 1.0617 [0.2,∞) [0.2,∞) 1.1078 (−∞, 5.9] (−∞, 5.9]
U44 3.9006 [0.4,∞) [0.6,∞) 4.5592 [2,∞) [2,∞)
U45 1.3727 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
U51 1 1 1
U52 0.8632 [−0.7, 1.6] [−0.7, 1.6]
U53 1.1269 [0.3,∞) [0.3,∞)
U54 1.0261 (−∞, 5.9] (−∞, 5.9]
U55 3.6316 [0.6,∞) [0.6,∞)
V11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
V12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 {−1, 1} {−1, 1}
V13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 {−1, 1} {−1, 1}
V14 1 1 1 1 1 1
V15 1 1 1
V21 0.2716 [−0.6, 0.8] [−0.6, 0.8] 0.2107 [−0.8, 0.8] [−0.8, 0.8] 0.1779 [−0.7, 0.4] [−0.7, 0.4]
V22 3.7589 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 2.9469 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 3.6739 [2.6,∞) [2.6,∞)
V23 1.2428 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 1.3043 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 0.7883 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
V24 1.7284 [1.2,∞) [1.2,∞) 0.8864 (−∞, 4.9] (−∞, 4.9]
V25 1.1024 [0.3,∞) [0.3,∞)
V31 0.2285 [−0.8, 0.6] [−0.8, 0.6] 0.2635 [−0.8, 2.6] [−0.8, 1.4] 0.2688 [−0.7, 1.6] [−0.7, 1.6]
V32 1.0389 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 1.1851 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 1.2342 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
V33 5.3601 [1.4,∞) [1.4,∞) 4.3093 [1.4,∞) [1.4,∞) 4.8803 [1.7,∞) [1.7,∞)
V34 2.0316 [1.4,∞) [1.4,∞) 1.1433 [0.3,∞) [0.3,∞)
V35 1.0688 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
V41 0.1995 [−1.2, 0.8] [−0.8, 0.6] 0.1942 [−0.7, 0.4] [−0.7, 0.4]
V42 0.9118 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.9721 (−∞, 5.8] (−∞, 5.8]
V43 1.3259 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 1.3373 (−∞, 5.9] (−∞, 5.9]
V44 9.1210 [1.6,∞) [1.6,∞) 4.5940 [2,∞) [2,∞)
V45 1.3243 [0.3,∞) [0.3,∞)
V51 0.2329 [−0.7, 1.6] [−07, 1.6]
V52 0.8259 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
V53 1.5688 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
V54 1.1778 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
V55 4.4209 [1.7,∞) [1.7,∞)
Φ11 2 2 2. 2 2 2 2 2 2
Φ12 1.2668 [0.2, 1.8] [0.2, 1.6] 1.2774 [0.4, 1.8] [0.4, 1.8] 1.3218 [−1.7, 1.4] [−1.7, 1.4]
Φ13 1.2775 [0.4, 3.6] [0.4, 1.8] 1.2060 [0.2, 1.6] [0.2, 1.6] 1.2354 (−∞, 1.4] (−∞, 1.4]
Φ14 1.2292 [0.4, 3.2] [0.4, 2.4] 1.2878 [0.3, 4.8] [0.3, 4.8]
Φ15 1.2878 [0.3, 4.8] [0.3, 4.8]
Φ21 1.2716 [0.4, 1.8] [0.4, 1.8] 1.2107 [0.2, 1.8] [0.2, 1.6] 1.1779 [−1.7, 1.4] [−1.7, 1.4]
Φ22 7.5812 [2.4,∞) [2.4,∞) 6.3785 [2.4,∞) [2.4,∞) 10.4849 [4.9,∞) [4.9,∞)
Φ23 2.2557 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 2.3043 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 1.1767 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ24 2.7979 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 1.8864 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ25 2.4611 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ31 1.2285 [0.2, 1.6] [0.2, 1.6] 1.2635 [0.2, 3.6] [0.2, 2.4] 1.2688 [−1.7, 2.6] [−1.7, 2.6]
Φ32 2.0593 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 2.2732 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 2.3588 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ33 10.7722 [2.8,∞) [2.8,∞) 8.5266 [2.8,∞) [2.8,∞) 8.5948 [3.8,∞) [3.8,∞)
Φ34 3.0316 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 2.0098 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ35 1.8790 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ41 1.1995 [−0.2, 1.8] [−0.2, 1.6] 1.1942 [0.3, 1.4] [0.3, 1.4]
Φ42 1.8262 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 2.1491 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ43 2.3876 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 2.4451 (−∞, 11.8] (−∞, 11.8]
Φ44 13.0215 [2,∞) [2.2,∞) 9.1532 [4,∞) [4,∞)
Φ45 2.6970 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ51 1.2329 [0.3, 2.6] [0.3, 2.6]
Φ52 1.6892 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ53 2.6957 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ54 2.2039 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Φ55 8.0525 [2.2,∞) [2.2,∞)
Table 3: Projections of the identified sets of U , V , and Φ in the second simulation exercise.
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r = 3 r = 4 r = 5
Parameters True & CS [5] [6] True & CS [5] [6] True & CS [5] [6]
D22,11(Φ) 7.0428 [0.8,∞) [1,∞) 5.8904 [0.8,∞) [1,∞) 9.9852 [5.1,∞) [5.1,∞)
D33,11(Φ) 10.2662 [−0.4,∞) [1.4,∞) 8.0571 [−0.4,∞) [0.8,∞) 8.0906 [2.9,∞) [2.9,∞)
D44,11(Φ) 12.5929 [−1,∞) [0.2,∞) 8.6711 [−0.2,∞) [−0.2,∞)
D55,11(Φ) 7.5318. [−3.1,∞) [−3.1,∞)
D33,22(Φ) 14.0383 [0.8,∞) [0.8,∞) 10.3276 [0.6,∞) [0.6,∞) 15.5443 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
D44,22(Φ) 14.7760 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 15.6027 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
D55,22(Φ) 14.3872 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
D44,33(Φ) 16.1290 [0.4,∞) [0.4,∞) 13.2931 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
D55,33(Φ) 12.0726 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
D55,44(Φ) 12.3048 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C21(U) 0.9727 [0.1188,∞) [0.2033,∞) 1.6252 [−0.1308,∞) [−0.1232,∞) 3.1561 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C31(U) 2.9421 [0.2659,∞) [0.3511,∞) 1.9579 [0.0754,∞) [0.0830,∞) 1.6026 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C41(U) 1.9116 [−0.5684,∞) [−0.4466,∞) 2.1100 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C51(U) 1.5932 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C32(U) 0.9694 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.3327 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) −1.5534 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C42(U) 0.2865 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) −1.0461 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C52(U) −1.5629 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C43(U) −0.0463 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.5073 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C53(U) −0.0095 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C54(U) −0.5168 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C21(V ) 2.0310 [0.2264,∞) [0.2264,∞) 1.4064 [−0.0795,∞) [0.0076,∞) 1.6035 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C31(V ) 3.0458 [0.3581,∞) [0.3581,∞) 2.2766 [0.3191,∞) [0.4062,∞) 2.4680 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C41(V ) 4.9699 [0.4239,∞) [0.5110,∞) 2.1398 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C51(V ) 2.0755 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C32(V ) 1.0148 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.8702 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.8645 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C42(V ) 3.5634 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) 0.5363 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C52(V ) 0.4720 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C43(V ) 2.6932 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) −0.3282 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C53(V ) −0.3925 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
C54(V ) −0.0643 (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)




In this section, we use our methodology to re-examine some of the questions considered in the
empirical literature on the marriage market that have been answered by relying on the Multinomial
Logit 1to1TU model.
An important question is whether educational sorting has changed over time as this can be key
to understand the sources of inequality in intergenerational outcomes (see references in Section 1).
Detecting changes in educational sorting is challenging because it requires us to disentangle the
effect of changes in the marginal probability distribution of education categories from potential
structural changes in the match surplus. In fact, men and especially women have become more
educated over time. This implies that individuals with similar education levels are mechanically
more likely to marry. We are thus interested in capturing the changes in educational sorting
after having accounted for the variations naturally arising due to such distributional variations in
education.
The literature offers two approaches to do this. The first consists of using indices of sorting
which rely on comparing empirical matches to a random matching counterfactual (e.g., Eika,
Mogstad, and Zafar, 2019 and other references in Section 1). The second consists of using a
structural model of the marriage market to estimate individual preferences. For instance, one
can take the 1to1TU model with X = Y ≡ {1, ..., r} listing education categories. Recall the
definition of the supermodular core of Φ, denoted as D(Φ), from (1) and (2). As per Definition
1 of Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) and Definition 7 of Chiappori, Costa-Dias, and Meghir
(2020), if each component of the vector D(Φ) is strictly positive, then there is positive educational
sorting. Further, a given time period t displays more positive educational sorting than another
time period t′ if and only if D(Φt) > D(Φt′) componentwise. The second approach has been
implemented by Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017), Chiappori, Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2020),
and other authors cited in Section 1 within the Multinomial Logit structure of Choo and Siow
(2006).
Both approaches lead to the conclusion that positive educational sorting has overall increased
in the U.S. in the past decades, although there is some debate about this trend when we dis-
tinguish among education categories. For instance, Eika, Mogstad, and Zafar (2019) find that
positive educational sorting has declined among the highly educated and increased among the less
educated. Instead, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) find that positive educational sorting
has increased in each education category, particularly at the top of the education distribution.
Similarly, Chiappori, Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2020) find that positive educational sorting has
increased in each education category, with the exception of high-school graduates. Note, how-
ever, that the conclusions achieved via the structural approach, while having the advantages of
being directly related to the underlying force that determines matching, may be driven by the
Multinomial Logit structure. Our objective is to use the methodology of Section 4 to investi-
gate the robustness of those conclusions and, specifically, whether they are obtainable also under
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nonparametric distributional restrictions on the unobserved heterogeneity, such as those listed in
Assumption 5.
In addition to studying the evolution of educational sorting, this section touches upon another
important question in the empirical literature on the marriage market. In particular, as discussed
by Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017), the increase in educational sorting makes a higher stock
of human capital more valuable on the marriage market. Therefore, one should also expect an
increase in the marital education premium, especially at the highest levels of education and for
women. Based on the Multinomial Logit 1to1TU model, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017)
empirically confirm such a prediction for the U.S. As discussed in Section 4.2, our methodology
does not allow us to compute the marital education premium. Nevertheless, it permits us to get
bounds on quantities that contribute to the marital education premium, namely C(U) and C(V ),
as outlined in (3), (4), and (5). In turn, such bounds will help us make certain conclusions on the
marital education premium without relying on parametric distributional restrictions.
The remainder of the section is organised as follows: in Section 6.1, we describe the data; in
Section 6.2, we present and interpret our results.
6.1 Data
We focus on the U.S. marriage market and take our data from the American Community Survey,
that is a representative extract of the census. To construct the final dataset, we follow the steps
outlined in Section I.A and Appendix B of Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017). In particular,
from the 21, 583, 529 households in the 2008 to 2014 waves, we take all white adults who are
out of school. We record the education level of each adult, by distinguishing four categories as
in Chiappori, Costa-Dias, and Meghir (2020): high school dropouts (HSD, or “1”); high school
graduates (HSG, or “2”); some college (SC, or “3”); four-year college graduates and graduate
degrees (CG, or “4”).19 We treat individuals as married if they define themselves as such, without
including cohabitation. We focus on first marriages and never-married singles. The final sample
consists of 1, 502, 157 couples and 136, 052 singles.
We define cohorts by using year of birth and take women to be one year younger. For instance,
cohort 1940 includes all men born in year 1940 and all women born in year 1941. In turn, the
sample analogue of p1940y|x is computed by taking the ratio between the number of men of type
x ∈ X who are born in year 1940 and marry a woman of type y ∈ Y0 born in any year, and the
number of men of type x ∈ X who are born in year 1940. Similarly, the sample analogue of p1940x|y
is computed by taking the ratio between the number of women of type y ∈ Y who are born in
year 1941 and marry a man of type x ∈ X0 born in any year, and the number of women of type
y ∈ Y who are born in year 1941.20 In what follows, we provide some descriptive analysis using
19For the white population, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) further distinguish between four-year college
graduates and graduate degrees. We have run our analysis also under such additional distinction and obtained less
informative bounds.
20We ignore the issue of cohort mixing in order to exactly mimic the data construction process of Chiappori,
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all of the 27 cohorts between cohort 1940 and 1966, as in Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017).
In our empirical application, we focus on a few representative cohorts, namely cohorts 1940, 1945,
1950, 1955, 1960, and 1966.
Figure 1 reveals that the proportion of college educated men increases until 1950, then drops,
and finally reverses into an increase around 1960. Instead, the proportion of college educated
women always increases. Moreover, the proportion of college educated women is lower than that
of men 1940, while the opposite is true by 1966. These changes imply that the evolution of
educational sorting cannot be inferred by simply comparing matching patters across cohorts.


























Figure 1: Education of men and women.
Figure 2 (a) shows an increase in the proportion of marriages of like with like. A substantial surge
is also registered when focusing on the proportion of couples where both spouses have a college
degree (Figure 2 (b)). However, as discussed earlier, these figures are not proof of an increase in
educational sorting because they may be mechanically driven by changes in the proportions of
individuals in each education category.
Salanié, and Weiss (2017) so as to make our conclusions as comparable as possible. In particular, given that the
modal age difference within couples is one year in the data, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) concentrate their
analysis on couples in which the age difference takes one year.
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Figure 2: Comparing spouses.
6.2 Results
For each of the six cohorts considered, we construct the identified sets of U , V , Φ, D(Φ), C(U),
and C(V ) under specifications [5], [6], and [7] of Table 1. Among the seven specifications of Table
1, we focus on specifications [5], [6], and [7] because they seem to deliver the tightest bounds
according to our simulations in Section 5.
We start with discussing the results on Φ and D(Φ). Table 5 reports the projections of the
estimated identified sets of Φ and D(Φ) under specification [5] of Table 1. Each row corresponds
to a 2 × 2 sub-matrix of Φ that keeps same-education marriages in the main diagonal. Each
column corresponds to a cohort. The estimated identified sets are obtained by implementing
the methodology illustrated in Section 4.5 to the empirical distribution of the data. We adopt
the scale normalisations (30) described in Section 5. These scale normalisations imply that the
projection of the estimated identified set of Φ11 is a subset of {−2, 0, 2}. These scale normali-
sations also imply that the estimates of Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) do not necessarily
belong to our projections because we impose scale normalisations on U and V , whereas Chiappori,
Salanié, and Weiss (2017) impose scale normalisations via the parameterisation of the taste shock
distributions. As in Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017), we assume that the cohorts feature
independent matching processes and apply the procedure separately to the sample of each cohort.
However, our analysis is more robust in many ways. First, we allow the taste shock distributions
to be arbitrarily different across cohorts, within the family of distributions outlined by specifi-
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cation [5] of Table 1. Second and importantly, we allow for potential endogeneity of education
and conditional heteroskedasticity of the taste shocks. Third, the taste shocks can display any
correlation structure. Instead, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) assume that, in each cohort,
the taste shocks are i.i.d. standard Extreme Value Type I, independently distributed from educa-
tion categories. They incorporate conditional heteroskedasticity in some final specification checks
but encounter robustness issues possibly due to overparametrization. Finally, we allow Φ to be
arbitrarily different across cohorts, whereas Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) assume that Φ
is identical across cohorts up to some drifts or linear/quadratic trends. In other words, Chiappori,
Salanié, and Weiss (2017) restrict the evolution of Φ over time, while instead we remain agnostic
about it so as to avoid misspecifications of the underlying dynamics.21
Overall, the conclusions from Table 5 can be summarised as follows. In most of the cases, the
projections for Φ are quite similar or nested across cohorts. For instance, Figure 3 highlights that
the projections for Φ in cohort 1966 (in blue) are often subsets of the projections for Φ in cohort
1940 (in black). Further, the ability of the model to recover the sign and magnitude of the Φ’s
components improves across cohorts. In fact, the number of projections for Φ that lie entirely on
the negative or positive part of the real line and/or that are bounded increases across cohorts.
Nevertheless, a non-negligible number of projections for Φ remain unbounded at least on one
side in each cohort. This implies that, when we take the algebraic sum of such projections in
order to compute D(Φ), we obtain unbounded intervals. In particular, the projections for D(Φ)
are completely uninformative up to cohort 1950. The projections for D(Φ) start to unambiguously
reveal the presence of positive educational sorting in cohort 1955 within some education categories,
by lying entirely on the positive part of the real line. In cohort 1966, the presence of positive
educational sorting is confirmed within every education category. Further, in each of the cohorts
1955, 1960, and 1966, the interval of D44,11(Φ) has the highest lower bound, indicating that
positive educational sorting might be especially evident within the most (least) educated fraction
of the population. In short, the 1to1TU model is progressively more informative over time about
the direction of educational sorting.
However, nothing can be said about the evolution of positive educational sorting over time:
given that all of the projections for D(Φ) are unbounded on the right-hand-side, positive edu-
cational sorting may increase or decrease across cohorts within each education category. This
differs from the empirical findings of Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) which, instead, reveal
an increase in positive educational sorting over time within each education category, especially
among the college educated people. Our results suggest that such a conclusion may be driven by
the Multinomial Logit structure assigned to unobserved heterogeneity.
We now move to discuss the results on U , V , C(U), and C(V ). Table 6 reports the projections
of the estimated identified sets of U and C(U) under specification [5] of Table 1. Every row
21More technically, Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) need to assume that Φ is identical across cohorts up
to some drifts or linear/quadratic trends in order to generate over-identifying restrictions which can be used, in
turn, for testing changes in the structural parameters across cohorts (see also our discussion in Section 2). This is
not needed here because we are in a partial identification framework.
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corresponds to a 4 × 2 sub-matrix of U that spans over two education categories of men. Every
column corresponds to a cohort. Table 7 reports the projections of the estimated identified sets
of V and C(V ) under specification [5] of Table 1 and is structured analogously to Table 6.
As seen for Φ, the projections for U and V are quite similar or nested across cohorts. For
instance, from Figures 4 and 5, we can notice that the projections for U and V in cohort 1966
(in blue) are often subsets of the projections for U and V in cohort 1940 (in black). Further, the
projections for U in cohort 1966 are much tighter than the projections for U in cohort 1940. In
fact, the identifying power of the model with respect to U improves across cohorts. For example,
from Table 6, the proportion of bounded projections for U is 616 in 1940,
8
16 in 1945 and 1950,
9
16
in 1950 and 1955, and 1316 in 1966. Table 6 does not reveal a similar trend for the women’s side,
with the proportion of bounded projections for V equal to 816 in each cohort, except in cohort
1960 where it is 716 .
Besides, a non-trivial number of projections for U and V remain unbounded at least on one
side. This implies that when we take the algebraic sum of such projections in order to compute
C(U) and C(V ), we obtain unbounded intervals in almost each cohort. In turn, the identified
sets of the marital education premia will be unbounded as well (see Equation (3)). Hence, we
find no evidence for the increase in those premia over time. This is particularly true for the
women’s side, where almost every component of C(V ) is unbounded on both sides in each cohort.
Such conclusions differ from the empirical findings of Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss (2017) which,
instead, reveal an increase in the marital college premium over time, especially for women. As
earlier, our results suggest that this may be driven by the Multinomial Logit assumption.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 are based on the estimated identified sets of the parameters. In Appendix
G, we also report the projections of the corresponding 95% confidence regions to account for the
sampling uncertainty (Tables G.1, G.2, and G.3). These confidence regions are constructed by
using the bootstrap-based procedure of Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017). In Appendix F, we discuss
in detail how this procedure applies to our specific setting. The findings of Tables 5, 6, and 7 are
overall confirmed.
Lastly, Tables 5, 6, and 7 are based on specification [5] of Table 1. We have also considered
specifications [6] and [7], which are more restrictive. Specification [6] delivers numerically almost
identical results. Specification [7] delivers slightly tighter bounds in certain cases without altering
the above conclusions. We report the results under specification [7] in Appendix G (Tables G.4,
G.5, and G.6).
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D44,33(Φ) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) [0.1717,∞)
Table 5: Projections of the estimated identified sets of Φ and D(Φ) under specification [5] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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Figure 3: Projections of the estimated identified set of Φ under specification [5] of Table 1. The
blue region refers to cohort 1966. The black region refers to cohort 1940. “1” denotes high school
dropouts; “2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year
college graduates and graduate degrees.
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[−0.6667, 0.6667] [−2.2424, 0.1414]

























































[−0.6667, 0.6667] [−2.2424, 0.1414]























































[−0.6667, 0.6667] [−2.2424, 0.1414]
−1 [−0.8485, 0.6364]
[−0.8182, 0.8182] [−0.3434,∞)
C43(U) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) [−0.5978,∞)
Table 6: Projections of the estimated identified sets of U and C(U) under specification [5] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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C43(V ) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Table 7: Projections of the estimated identified sets of V and C(V ) under specification [5] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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Figure 4: Projections of the estimated identified set of U under specification [5] of Table 1. The
blue region refers to cohort 1966. The black region refers to cohort 1940. “1” denotes high school
dropouts; “2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year
college graduates and graduate degrees.
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Figure 5: Projections of the estimated identified set of V under specification [5] of Table 1. The
blue region refers to cohort 1966. The black region refers to cohort 1940. “1” denotes high school
dropouts; “2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year
college graduates and graduate degrees.
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7 Conclusions
This paper investigates the identifying power of the 1to1TU model for the systematic match
surplus and related policy-relevant quantities, when no parametric distributional assumption on
the unobserved heterogeneity is imposed. We conclude our analysis by highlighting three main
findings. First, some nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity
are needed for the 1to1TU model to retain some information about the systematic match surplus
with data on one large market (even after accounting for scale and location normalisations).
Second, we propose a computational approach for constructing the identified set of the systematic
match surplus that is based on principles of linear programming and works under various classes
of nonparametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity. Third, we use our
methodology to re-examine some relevant questions in the empirical literature on the marriage
market which have been studied under the Multinomial Logit assumption. Our results do not
support the conclusions achieved under the Multinomial Logit assumption.
Lastly, we remark that we have been able to practically implement our methodology for up
to five types on each side of the market, by parallelising our codes and using cluster facilities.
Many empirical applications to the marriage market consider between three and five types, espe-
cially when focusing on education levels. Scaling up further might be computationally difficult
because the linear programming problems to solve become large in the number of unknowns and
constraints. Similar curses of dimensionality are faced by other nonparametric and partial identi-
fication procedures, but this need not stop researchers from finding methodologies that are more
robust than fully parametric approaches.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof is organised in the following steps. Fix any Φ ∈ Θ. Consider any U ∈ U and V ∈ V
such that Uxy + Vxy = Φxy for each (x, y) ∈ X × Y . In Steps 1-4, we show by construction that
there exists {Fx}x∈X ∈ F such that py|x = κ(U, Fx, y) for each (x, y) ∈ X × Y0. In Step 5, we
replicate the same arguments for the women’s side and show that there exists {Gy}y∈Y ∈ G such
that px|y = κ(V,Gy, x) for each (x, y) ∈ X0 × Y . In Step 6, we highlight that our conclusions do
not change if we impose scale normalisations on U and V .
For simplicity of exposition, we provide the proof of Proposition 2 for the case X0 ≡ Y0 ≡
{0, 1, 2}. The proof for a generic case follows exactly the same steps, but becomes notationally
more complicated.
Step 1 Start from the men’s side. For every (x, y) ∈ X × Y0, let RUy|x be the set of taste shock
realisations such that it is optimal for a man of type x to choose a woman of type y. More
formally,
RU0|x ≡ {(e0, e1, e2) ∈ R3 : e1 − e0 ≤ −Ux1, e2 − e0 ≤ −Ux2},
RU1|x ≡ {(e0, e1, e2) ∈ R3 : e1 − e0 ≥ −Ux1, e1 − e2 ≥ Ux2 − Ux1},
RU2|x ≡ {(e0, e1, e2) ∈ R3 : e2 − e0 ≥ −Ux2, e1 − e2 ≤ Ux2 − Ux1},
for each x ∈ X . Our objective is to show that there exists {Fx}x∈X ∈ F such that
py|x = λFx(RUy|x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0, (A.1.1)
where λFx is the measure associated with Fx.
Step 2 As usual in multinomial choice models, we can reduce the problem by one dimension.
Hence, let ζ ≡ (ζ1, ζ2) be a 2-dimensional random vector with CDF conditional on Xi = x denoted
by Hx, for every x ∈ X . Hx can be any continuous CDF with bounded support in R2. Further,
let Hx,µ,σ be the CDF of σζ + µ conditional on Xi = x, with µ ∈ R2 and σ ∈ R+, for each x ∈ X .
Lastly, let
QU0|x ≡ {(ẽ1, ẽ2) ∈ R2 : ẽ1 ≤ −Ux1, ẽ2 ≤ −Ux2},
QU1|x ≡ {(ẽ1, ẽ2) ∈ R2 : ẽ1 ≥ −Ux1, ẽ1 − ẽ2 ≥ Ux2 − Ux1},
QU2|x ≡ {(ẽ1, ẽ2) ∈ R2 : ẽ2 ≥ −Ux2, ẽ1 − ẽ2 ≤ Ux2 − Ux1},
for each x ∈ X .
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Step 3 In this step we show that, for each x ∈ X , there exists a location µ ∈ R2 and a scale
σ ∈ R+ (possibly different across x) such that
py|x = λHx,µ,σ(QUy|x) ∀y ∈ Y0,
where λHx,µ,σ is the measure associated with Hx,µ,σ.
Step 3.1 Fix x ∈ X . Note that, by continuity of Hx, the mapping
(µ, σ) ∈ R2 × R+ 7→ λHx,µ,σ(A) ∈ [0, 1],
is continuous, for every measurable set A ⊆ R2. Consequently, the mapping
hx : (µ, σ) ∈ R2 × R+ 7→ (λHx,µ,σ(QU0|x), λHx,µ,σ(QU1|x), λHx,µ,σ(QU2|x)) ∈ [0, 1]3,
is also continuous. Further, given that {QU0|x,QU1|x,QU2|x} is a partition of R2, the image set of hx
is a subset of the unit simplex,
S ≡ {(t1, t2, t3) ∈ R3 : t1 + t2 + t3 = 1, t1 ≥ 0, t2 ≥ 0, t3 ≥ 0}.
Step 3.2 We now show that the image set of hx is the unit simplex. In fact, observe that:
1. Fix any point z ∈ QU0|x. By setting µ = z and shrinking σ, one can focus almost the entire
image of hx within QU0|x, i.e.,
lim
σ→0+
hx(z, σ) = (1, 0, 0).
Thus, the image set of hx is arbitrarily close to the vertex (1, 0, 0) of the unit simplex.
Further, the image set of hx contains such a vertex because the support of Hx is bounded.
Repeat the same argument forQU1|x andQU2|x. Conclude that the image set of hx is arbitrarily
close to (and include) all the vertices of the unit simplex.
2. Fix any two points, z, r, in the interiors of QU0|x and QU1|x, respectively. Consider the contin-
uous curve
t ∈ [a, b] 7→ γ0,1(t) ∈ R2
connecting z and r, while passing through the interior of QU0|x ∪QU1|x and not through QU2|x.
Note that such a continuous curve always exists because QU0|x,QU1|x,QU2|x consists of three
infinite angular sectors located at (−Ux1,−Ux2). Shrink σ arbitrarily close to zero and
consider the continuous function
ιx : t ∈ [a, b] 7→ hx(γ0,1(t), σ) ∈ S.
Since σ is arbitrarily close to zero and γ0,1(t) /∈ QU2|x, it follows that the third component
48
of ιx(t) is arbitrarily close to zero, for each t ∈ [a, b]. Further, observe that the endpoints
of the image set of ιx are arbitrarily close to the vertices (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) of the unit
simplex. Therefore, the image set of ιx is arbitrarily close to the edge of the unit simplex
between the vertices (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0). Further, by the same arguments of 1. of Step 3.2,
the image set of ιx contains such an edge because the support of Hx is bounded.
Repeat the same argument for the other two edges, by fixing any two points in the interiors
of QU0|x and QU2|x, and any two points in the interiors of QU1|x and QU2|x.
Conclude that the image set of hx is arbitrarily close to (and include) all the edges of the
unit simplex.
The two facts above imply that the image set of hx is the unit simplex.
Step 3.3 Since the image set of hx is the unit simplex, there exists µ ∈ R2 and σ ∈ R+ such
that
py|x = λHx,µ,σ(QUy|x) ∀y ∈ Y0.
Step 4 In this step we go back to the original dimension of our problem. Consider any random
vector (εi0, ε̃i1, ε̃i2) such that (ε̃i1, ε̃i2) has CDF conditional on Xi = x equal to Hx,µ,σ, for every
x ∈ X . Take the random vector εi ≡ (εi0, ε̃i1 + εi0, ε̃i2 + εi0) and denote its CDF conditional on
Xi = x by Fx, for every x ∈ X . By construction, {Fx}x∈X solves (A.1.1).
Step 5 Repeat Steps 1-4 for the women’s side to show that there exists {Gy}y∈Y ∈ G such that
px|y = λGy(RVx|y) ∀(y, x) ∈ Y × X0,
where λGy is the measure associated with Gy. Hence, the result claimed by Proposition 2 follows.
Step 6 In Section 5 and Appendix E.1, we discuss some scale normalisations that one may want
to impose on U and V .22 In short, these scale normalisations amount to fixing to 1 the absolute
value of some of the U and V ’s components. Since these are just specific values of U and V , the
above steps still go through.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is organised in the following steps. In Step 0, we recall the notation introduced in
Section 4.5.2 and introduce some new one. In Step 1, we present the notion of an equivalence
class for every U ∈ U and prove that if Ũ , Û ∈ U belong to the same equivalence class, then they
induce the same feasible set of the linear programming problem of Section 4.5.1. In Step 2, we
22Note that appropriate location normalisations have been already imposed by Proposition 1, i.e., Ux0 = V0y = 0
for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y.
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show how such equivalence classes are related to the notion of π-ordering used in Proposition 3.
In Step 3, we conclude. Remark A.1 explains how Proposition 3 is implemented in practice.
For simplicity of exposition, we provide the proof of Proposition 3 for the case r = 2 and
Assumption 5.2. The proof for a generic case follows exactly the same steps, but becomes nota-
tionally more complicated. In the case considered, we have that
Ax,1,U ≡ {−Ux1, Ux1, 0,∞,−∞},
Ax,2,U ≡ {−Ux2, Ux2, 0,∞,−∞},
Ax,3,U ≡ {Ux2 − Ux1,−Ux2 + Ux1, 0,∞,−∞},
for every x ∈ X and U ∈ U . Therefore, for any given U ∈ U and by following Section 4.5.1,
∃ {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F † s.t. py|x = κ(U,∆Fx, y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
if and only if, for every x ∈ X , the following linear programming problem is feasible with respect
to ∆F̄Ux : Ax,U → R,
p1|x = 1 + ∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞,∞), (A.2.1)
p2|x = ∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (∞,−Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1), (A.2.2)
p0|x = ∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,−Ux2,∞), (A.2.3)
∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞,∞), (A.2.4)
∆F̄Ux (∞,−Ux2,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,−Ux2,−∞), (A.2.5)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,∞,−Ux2 + Ux1), (A.2.6)
∆F̄Ux (0,∞,∞) = 1/2, (A.2.7)
∆F̄Ux (∞, 0,∞) = 1/2, (A.2.8)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, 0) = 1/2, (A.2.9)
∆F̄Ux (−∞, t, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,2,U ×Ax,3,U , (A.2.10)
∆F̄Ux (t,−∞, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1,U ×Ax,3,U , (A.2.11)
∆F̄Ux (t, q,−∞) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1,U ×Ax,2,U , (A.2.12)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞,∞) = 1, (A.2.13)
0 ≤ ∆F̄Ux (t, q, r) ≤ 1 ∀(t, q, r) ∈ Ax,U , (A.2.14)
[−∆F̄Ux (t, q, r) + ∆F̄Ux (t′, q, r) + ∆F̄Ux (t, q′, r)−∆F̄Ux (t′, q′, r)+
∆F̄Ux (t, q, r′)−∆F̄Ux (t′, q, r′)−∆F̄Ux (t, q′, r′) + ∆F̄Ux (t′, q′, r′)] ≥ 0
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax,U
s.t. (t, q, r) ≤ (t′, q′, r′). (A.2.15)
In the linear programming above: (A.2.1)-(A.2.3) match the predicted conditional choice proba-
bilities with the empirical ones; (A.2.4)-(A.2.9) impose Assumption 5.2; (A.2.10)-(A.2.15) ensure
that ∆F̄Ux can be extended to a proper conditional CDF.
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Step 0 In this step, we recall the notation introduced in Section 4.5.2 and introduce some new
ones.
Fix U ∈ U and x ∈ X . In the setting considered, Ax,l,U has cardinality 5 for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Ax,U has cardinality 53. The image set of ∆F̄Ux , which we denote by ∆F̄Ux (Ax,U), has cardinality
53. In all such sets, possible repetitions of elements are kept.
For every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, αx,l,U is a 5 × 1 column vector listing the 5 elements of Ax,l,U . αx,U
is a 53 × 3 matrix listing the 53 3-tuples of Ax,U . Further, we reorder αx,U lexicographically by
row and call the reordered matrix αLx,U .23 fx,U is a 53× 1 column vector listing the 53 elements of
∆F̄Ux (Ax,U). ι : ∆F̄Ux (Ax,U)→ {1, 2, ..., 53}, where ι(k) is the row index of scalar k in the vector
fx,U . τ : Ax,U → {1, 2, ..., 53}, where τ(k) is the row index of 3-tuple k in the matrix αLx,U .
For every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Π1 is the set of all possible permutations without repetition of
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and Π2 ≡ {<,=}4. π : R̄5 → Π1 × Π2, where π(α) ≡ (π1(α), π2(α)), ∀α ∈ R̄5.
In particular, π1(α) sorts the 5 elements of α from smallest to largest and reports their posi-
tions in the original vector. π2(α) reports the relational operators, < or =, among the sorted
elements of α. When α contains multiple elements with the same value, then we adopt any con-
vention on which element to sort first. We call π(α) the “π-ordering” of α. For instance, suppose
α = (100, 99, 0,∞,−∞). Then, π(α) = {(5, 3, 2, 1, 4), (<,<,<,<)}. Suppose α = (1, 5, 5, 6,−∞).
Then, π(α) = {(5, 1, 2, 3, 4), (<,<,=, <)}.
Step 1 In this step, we present the notion of an equivalence class for every U ∈ U and prove
that if Ũ , Û ∈ U belong to the same equivalence class, then they induce the same feasible set to
the linear programming problem (A.2.1)-(A.2.15).
Let x ∈ X and Ũ , Û ∈ U . Define
Cx(Ũ) ≡
{





{(t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)} : (t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′) ∈ Ax(Û), (t̂, q̂, r̂) ≤ (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)
}
.
Definition A.1. (Equivalence class) Let Ũ , Û ∈ U . Û is said to belong to the equivalence class
of Ũ at x ∈ X if the following two conditions hold:
23For example, suppose that Ax,U contains three 3-tuples (instead of 53 3-tuples, for shortness of exposition):
(3, 1, 2), (2, 3, 4), (2, 1, 3). Then,
αLx,U ≡




1. For every {(t̃, q̃, r̃), (t̃′, q̃′, r̃′)} ∈ Cx(Ũ), there exists {(t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)} ∈ Cx(Û) such that
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃, q̃, r̃)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂, q̂, r̂)),
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′, q̃, r̃)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′, q̂, r̂)),
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃, q̃′, r̃)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂, q̂′, r̂)),
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′, q̃′, r̃)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′, q̂′, r̂)),
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃, q̃, r̃′)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂, q̂, r̂′)),
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′, q̃, r̃′)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′, q̂, r̂′)),
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃, q̃′, r̃′)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂, q̂′, r̂′)),
ι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′, q̃′, r̃′)) = ι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)),
and vice-versa.
2. π2(αx,l,Ũ) = π2(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Let [Ũ ]x denote the equivalence class of Ũ at x ∈ X . 
Lemma A.1. Let x ∈ X and Ũ , Û ∈ U . If Û ∈ [Ũ ]x, then Ũ and Û induce the same feasible set
to the linear programming problem (A.2.1)-(A.2.15). 
Proof. Let x ∈ X and Ũ , Û ∈ U . Suppose Û ∈ [Ũ ]x. Take any {(t̃, q̃, r̃), (t̃′, q̃′, r̃′)} ∈ Cx(Ũ)
and a corresponding {(t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)} ∈ Cx(Û) such that Condition 1 of Definition A.1 holds.
Consider constraint (A.2.15) at {Ũ , (t̃, q̃, r̃), (t̃′, q̃′, r̃′)}, where the terms of the form ∆F̄ Ũx (·) are
unknowns to be determined. Relabel them as θι(∆F̄ Ũx (·)). Then, restate (A.2.15) as
− θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃,q̃,r̃)) + θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′,q̃,r̃)) + θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃,q̃′,r̃)) − θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′,q̃′,r̃))
+ θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃,q̃,r̃′)) − θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′,q̃,r̃′)) − θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃,q̃′,r̃′)) + θι(∆F̄ Ũx (t̃′,q̃′,r̃′)) ≥ 0,
(A.2.16)
where θ is a 53 × 1 vector of unknowns and θh denotes the h-th element of θ. Similarly, consider
the following relabelled constraint corresponding to Û ,
− θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂,q̂,r̂)) + θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′,q̂,r̂)) + θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂,q̂′,r̂)) − θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′,q̂′,r̂))
+ θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂,q̂,r̂′)) − θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′,q̂,r̂′)) − θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂,q̂′,r̂′)) + θι(∆F̄ Ûx (t̂′,q̂′,r̂′)) ≥ 0.
(A.2.17)
By Condition 1 of Definition A.1, the subscripts of θ in (A.2.16) and (A.2.17) are identical.
Further, if some or all of the components of (t̃, q̃, r̃) are equal to (t̃′, q̃′, r̃′), then Condition 2 of
Definition A.1 ensures that the same is true across (t̂, q̂, r̂) and (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′). Therefore, (A.2.16) and
(A.2.17) are identical. Similar arguments can be repeated for every {(t̃, q̃, r̃), (t̃′, q̃′, r̃′)} ∈ Cx(Ũ)
and {(t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)} ∈ Cx(Û) so that the constraints imposing 3-increasingness, (A.2.15), are
identical under Ũ and Û .
52
If the constraints (A.2.15) are identical under Ũ and Û , then they induce the feasible set to the
linear programming problem (A.2.1)-(A.2.15). This is because the only piece of (A.2.1)-(A.2.15)
that can potentially generate different solutions for different values of U is the one requiring the
function ∆F̄Ux to be 3-increasing.
Step 2 In this step, we show how the equivalence classes of Step 1 are related to the notion of
π-ordering used in Proposition 3.
Lemma A.2. Let x ∈ X and Ũ , Û ∈ U . If
i. π1(αx,l,Ũ) = π1(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3},
ii. π2(αx,l,Ũ) = π2(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3},
then Û ∈ [Ũ ]x. 
Proof. Condition ii of Lemma A.2 coincides with Condition 2 of Definition A.1. Therefore, in
what follows we show that Conditions i and ii of Lemma A.2 imply Condition 1 of Definition A.1.
Let x ∈ X . Let Ũ , Û ∈ U such that π(αx,l,Ũ) = π(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Take any
{(t̃, q̃, r̃), (t̃′, q̃′, r̃′)} ∈ Cx(Ũ), i.e., a comparable pair of 3-tuples fromAx(Ũ). Pick (t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′) ∈
Ax(Û) such that τ((t̂, q̂, r̂)) = τ((t̃, q̃, r̃)) and τ((t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)) = τ((t̃′, q̃′, r̃′)). Given that π1(αx,l,Ũ) =
π1(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, it should be that {(t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′)} ∈ Cx(Û). That is, by con-
struction, (t̂, q̂, r̂), (t̂′, q̂′, r̂′) should be a comparable pair of 3-tuples from Ax(Û). Moreover, given
π1(αx,l,Ũ) = π1(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3}, it should be that
τ((t̃′, q̃, r̃)) = τ((t̂′, q̂, r̂)),
τ((t̃, q̃′, r̃)) = τ((t̂, q̂′, r̂)),
τ((t̃′, q̃′, r̃)) = τ((t̂′, q̂′, r̂)),
τ((t̃, q̃, r̃′)) = τ((t̂, q̂, r̂′)),
τ((t̃′, q̃, r̃′)) = τ((t̂′, q̂, r̂′)),
τ((t̃, q̃′, r̃′)) = τ((t̂, q̂′, r̂′)).
















respectively, with 1d denoting the d-dimensional vector of ones. Reorder this new matrix lex-
icographically by row and call the reordered matrix bx,Ũ . Observe that bx,Ũ is a standardised
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relabelling of the matrix αL
x,Ũ
.24 Construct the matrix bx,Û in a similar way.
Note that π2(αx,l,Ũ) = π2(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3} ensures that bx,Ũ and bx,Û are logically
equivalent. Further, π1(αx,l,Ũ) = π1(αx,l,Û) for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3} implies bx,Ũ = bx,Û . Therefore,
it must be that Condition 1 of Definition A.1 is satisfied.
Step 3 In this step, we combine Steps 1 and 2 and conclude. Let x ∈ X and Ũ , Û ∈ U . Lemmas
A.1 and A.2 imply that if αx,l,Ũ and αx,l,Û have the same π-ordering for every l ∈ {1, 2, 3} (or,
equivalently, if Ũ and Û induce the same π-ordering), then the linear programming problem
(A.2.1)-(A.2.15) for Ũ has the same feasible set as the linear programming problem (A.2.1)-
(A.2.15) for Û . Hence, the result claimed by Proposition 3 follows.
Remark A.1. (Proposition 3 in practice) In practice, we use Proposition 3 as follows. First, we
generate a grid of points covering U as precisely as possible, depending on the available compu-
tational resources. Second, we find the π-ordering of each grid point for every l ∈ {1, ..., d} and
x ∈ X . Third, we group the grid points producing the same π-ordering for every l ∈ {1, ..., d} and
x ∈ X into the same “partitioning set”. In Matlab, steps 2 and 3 can be straightforwardly imple-
mented using the function sort. Fourth, we take a representative grid point for each partitioning
set. Fifth, for each of the selected grid points, we verify the feasibility of the linear programming
problem of Section 4.5.1. If the linear programming problem is feasible, then the corresponding
partitioning set belongs to the identified set (conditionally on the degeneracy condition being
satisfied, as discussed in Section 4.5.3). Otherwise, the corresponding partitioning set does not
belong to the identified set. The overall procedure can be easily parallelised.
Note that the number of partitioning sets increases with the granularity of the initial grid
of points covering U , with r, and with the number of nonparametric restrictions on {∆Fx}x∈X .
However, providing a general formula for the number of partitioning sets does not seem viable.
Note also that if ∆F † = ∆F , then there is only one partitioning set. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
For simplicity of exposition, we provide the proof of Proposition 4 when r = 2. The proof for a
generic r follows exactly the same steps, but becomes notationally more complicated.
Step 1 As highlighted in the main text, we should firstly observe that
B ≡ {(b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3 : b3 = b1 − b2} = {(b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3 : b1 = b2 + b3}.
24The matrix bx,U abstracts from the magnitudes of the elements of αLx,U and captures their relative positions.
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Accordingly, the relevant 3-dimensional boxes defined in Proposition 4 are
B1,2,3(b̂, b̃) ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x > b̂+ b̃, y ≤ b̂, z ≤ b̃},
Q1,2,3(b̂, b̃) ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x ≤ b̂+ b̃, y > b̂, z > b̃},
for any (b̂, b̃) ∈ Q2.
Step 2 Let
A1 ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x > y + z}.
We now show that
A1 = ∪(b̂,b̃)∈Q2B1,2,3(b̂, b̃).
It is clear that ∪(b̂,b̃)∈Q2B1,2,3(b̂, b̃) ⊆ A1. To prove the reverse, take any (x, y, z) ∈ A1 and
ε ≡ x− (y + z) > 0. Since Q is dense in R, there exists p ∈ [y, y + ε2 ] ∩Q and q ∈ [z, z +
ε
2 ] ∩Q.
Therefore, x = y+z+ ε > p+ q and, hence, (x, y, z) ∈ B1,2,3(p, q). Thus, A1 ⊆ ∪(b̂,b̃)∈Q2B1,2,3(b̂, b̃).
Step 3 Let
A2 ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x < y + z}.
By following the same arguments of step 2, we can show that
A2 = ∪(b̂,b̃)∈Q2Q1,2,3(b̂, b̃).
Step 4 Assume λ∆Fx(B1,2,3(b̂, b̃)) = λ∆Fx(Q1,2,3(b̂, b̃)) = 0 ∀(b̂, b̃) ∈ Q2. Hence, by Step 3, A1
and A2 are disjoint and infinitely countable unions of zero probability measure sets. Note that
Bc = A1 ∪ A2, where Bc denotes the complement of the region B in R3. Therefore, λ∆Fx(Bc) =
λ∆Fx(A1 ∪ A2) = 0, which is equivalent to λ∆Fx(B) = 1.
Step 5 Conversely, assume λ∆Fx(B) = 1. This implies λ∆Fx(∪(b̂,b̃)∈Q2B1,2,3(b̂, b̃)) = 0 and
λ∆Fx(∪(b̂,b̃)∈Q2Q1,2,3(b̂, b̃)) = 0. In turn, λ∆Fx(B1,2,3(b̂, b̃)) = λ∆Fx(Q1,2,3(b̂, b̃)) = 0 ∀(b̂, b̃) ∈ Q2.
B Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky (2019)
In this section we provide a formal statement of Theorem 1 in Torgovitsky (2019) within our
framework. We start with outlining some useful assumptions. We refer the reader to Definitions
1-5, Lemmas 1-2, and Corollary 1 in Torgovitsky (2019), which are the other key results and
definitions used by Theorem 1. In what follows, ∆Fx|C denotes the restriction of ∆Fx to a subset,
C, of its domain.
Assumption B.1. (Assumption A, Torgovitsky, 2019) ∆F † satisfies the following properties: for
each {∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F †, it holds that
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1. ∆Fx(a) = ∆Fx̃(a) ∀x, x̃ ∈ {X ∩ X †0,m0}, ∀a ∈ R̄d, ∀m0 ∈ {1, ...,M0}, where each X
†
0,m0 is a
known (possibly empty) subset of X .
2. ∆Fx,l(a) = ∆Fx̃,l(a) ∀x, x̃ ∈ {X ∩ X †l,ml}, ∀a ∈ R̄, ∀ml ∈ {1, ...,ML}, ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d}, where
each X †l,ml is a known (possibly empty) subset of X .
3. {∆Fx,l}x∈X ∈ ∆F †l ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d}, where ∆F
†
l is a known collection of families of one-
dimensional conditional CDFs.
4. ρ(U, {∆Fx}x∈X ) ≥ 0 for some known vector-valued function ρ, where the inequality is inter-
preted component wise.

In Assumption B.1, Conditions 1 and 2 are independence restrictions on {∆Fx}x∈X and
{∆Fx,l}x∈X , respectively. Condition 3 requires {∆Fx,l}x∈X to be extendible in the sense described
below in Proposition B.1. Condition 4 allows for miscellaneous restrictions, represented here by
a function ρ chosen by the researcher. Any of the Conditions 1-4 can be made non-restrictive by
using specific choices of X †0,m0 , X
†
l,ml
, ∆F †l , or ρ. The restrictions listed in Assumption 5 of Section
4.5.1 can be written in terms of 1-4.
Assumption B.2. (Condition U, Torgovitsky, 2019) Suppose that ∆F † satisfies Assumption
B.1. A collection of sets, {Ax,U}x∈X , satisfies Assumption B.2 if the following properties hold:
1. For every x ∈ X , Ax,U ≡ Ax,1,U ×Ax,2,U × ...×Ax,d(U), where Ax,l,U ⊆ R̄ is closed and such
that {∞,−∞} ⊆ Ax,l,U ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d}.
2. There exists functions κ̄ and ρ̄ such that, ∀{∆Fx}x∈X ∈ ∆F †,
κ(U,∆Fx, y) = κ̄(U,∆Fx|Ax,U , y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
ρ(U, {∆Fx}x∈X ) = ρ̄(U, {∆Fx|Ax,U}x∈X ).
3. ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d}, there exists a collection of families of conditional subsdistributions, ∆F̄ †l ,
such that
∆F̄ †l is extendible to ∆F
†
l ,





l , every ∆F̄Ux,l has common domain Ax,l,U .
4. Ax,U = Ax̃,U ∀x, x̃ ∈ {X ∩ X †0,m0} and ∀m0 ∈ {1, ...,M0}.
5. Ax,l,U = Ax̃,l,U ∀x, x̃ ∈ {X ∩ X †l,ml}, ∀ml ∈ {1, ...,ML}, and ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d}.

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Proposition B.1. (Theorem 1, Torgovitsky, 2019) Suppose that ∆F † can be represented as in
Assumption B.1. Take any U ∈ U . Let {Ax,U}x∈X be any collection of subsets of R̄d that satisfy
Assumption B.2. Suppose that, ∀x ∈ X , there exists ∆F̄Ux : Ax,U → R such that:
py|x = κ̄(U,∆F̄Ux , y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
∆F̄Ux is a d-dimensional subdistribution ∀x ∈ X ,
∆F̄Ux (a) = ∆F̄Ux̃ (a) ∀x, x̃ ∈ {X ∩ X
†
0,m0}, ∀a ∈ Ax,U , ∀m0 ∈ {1, ...,M0},
∆F̄Ux,l(a) = ∆F̄Ux̃,l(a) ∀x, x̃ ∈ {X ∩ X
†
l,ml
}, ∀a ∈ Ax,l,U , ∀ml ∈ {1, ...,ML}, ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d},
{∆F̄Ux,l}x∈X ∈ ∆F
†
l ∀l ∈ {1, ..., d},
ρ̄(U, {∆F̄Ux }x∈X ) ≥ 0.
Then, U ∈ U∗. 
C Other derivations
C.1 Derivation of (16)
For every y ∈ Y0, let RUy|x be the set of realisations of ∆εi such that it is optimal for main i of
type x to choose a woman of type y. More formally,
RU0|x ≡ {(∆e1,∆e2,∆e3) ∈ R
3 : ∆e1 ≥ −Ux1,∆e3 ≥ Ux2 − Ux1} = [−Ux1,∞)× (−∞,∞)× [Ux2 − Ux1,∞),
RU1|x ≡ {(∆e1,∆e2,∆e3) ∈ R
3 : ∆e2 ≥ −Ux2,∆e3 ≤ Ux2 − Ux1} = (−∞,∞)× [−Ux2,∞)× (−∞, Ux2 − Ux1],
RU2|x ≡ {(∆e1,∆e2,∆e3) ∈ R
3 : ∆e1 ≤ −Ux1,∆e2 ≤ Ux2} = (−∞,−Ux1]× (−∞,−Ux2]× (−∞,∞),
such that ∆e1, ∆e2, ∆e3 denote realisations of εi1 − εi0, εi2 − εi0, εi1 − εi2, respectively.
Therefore, the restriction py|x = κ(U,∆Fx, y) for every y ∈ Y0 can be more explicitly rewritten
as
p0|x = λ∆Fx([−Ux1,∞)× (−∞,∞)× [Ux2 − Ux1,∞)),
p1|x = λ∆Fx((−∞,∞)× [−Ux2,∞)× (−∞, Ux2 − Ux1]),
p1|x = λ∆Fx((−∞,−Ux1]× (−∞,−Ux2]× (−∞,∞)).
(C.1.1)
Now, recall that the measure of a cube can be rewritten using the CDF. In particular, for every
x ∈ X and [a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× [a3, b3] ⊆ R3, it holds that
λ∆Fx([a1, b1]× [a2, b2]× [a3, b3]) =
−∆Fx(a1, a2, a3) + ∆Fx(b1, a2, a3) + ∆Fx(a1, b2, a3)−∆Fx(b1, b2, a3)
+ ∆Fx(a1, a2, b3)−∆Fx(b1, a2, b3)−∆Fx(a1, b2, b3) + ∆Fx(b1, b2, b3).
(C.1.2)
By applying (C.1.2) to (C.1.1), we obtain (16).
57
C.2 Derivation of (29)
If r = 2, then
B ≡ {(b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3 : b3 = b1 − b2} = {(b1, b2, b3) ∈ R3 : b1 = b2 + b3}.
Accordingly, the relevant 3-dimensional boxes defined in Proposition 4 are
B1,2,3(b̂, b̃) ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x > b̂+ b̃, y ≤ b̂, z ≤ b̃},
Q1,2,3(b̂, b̃) ≡ {(x, y, z) ∈ R3 : x ≤ b̂+ b̃, y > b̂, z > b̃},
for any (b̂, b̃) ∈ Q2. Therefore,
λ∆Fx(Bt,p,q(b̂, b̃)) = λ∆Fx((b̂+ b̃,∞)× (−∞, b̂]× (−∞, b̃]),
λ∆Fx(Qt,p,q(b̂, b̃)) = λ∆Fx((−∞, b̂+ b̃]× (b̂,∞)× (b̃,∞)).
(C.2.1)
By applying (C.1.2) to (C.2.1), we obtain (29).
C.3 Matrix αx,U used in Section 4.5.2
αx,U ≡

−Ux1 −Ux2 Ux2 − Ux1
−Ux1 −Ux2 ∞
−Ux1 −Ux2 −∞
−Ux1 −∞ Ux2 − Ux1
−Ux1 −∞ ∞
−Ux1 −∞ −∞
−Ux1 ∞ Ux2 − Ux1
−Ux1 ∞ ∞
−Ux1 ∞ −∞
−Ux2 −Ux2 Ux2 − Ux1
−Ux2 −Ux2 ∞
−Ux2 −Ux2 −∞
−Ux2 −∞ Ux2 − Ux1
−Ux2 −∞ ∞
−Ux2 −∞ −∞
−Ux2 ∞ Ux2 − Ux1
−Ux2 ∞ ∞
−Ux2 ∞ −∞
Ux2 − Ux1 −Ux2 Ux2 − Ux1
Ux2 − Ux1 −Ux2 ∞
Ux2 − Ux1 −Ux2 −∞
Ux2 − Ux1 −∞ Ux2 − Ux1
Ux2 − Ux1 −∞ ∞
Ux2 − Ux1 −∞ −∞
Ux2 − Ux1 ∞ Ux2 − Ux1
Ux2 − Ux1 ∞ ∞
Ux2 − Ux1 ∞ −∞

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D Example of a linear programming problem
Fix U ∈ U . Impose Assumption 5.2. Select, for simplicity, two 2-tuples from Q2, (b̂1, b̃1), (b̂2, b̃2)
to approximate (27). Therefore,
Ax,1(U) ≡ {−Ux1,−Ux1, 0, b̂1 + b̃1,−b̂1 − b̃1, b̂2 + b̃2,−b̂2 − b̃2,∞,−∞},
Ax,2(U) ≡ {−Ux2,−Ux2, 0, b̂1,−b̂1, b̂2,−b̂2,∞,−∞},
Ax,3(U) ≡ {Ux2 − Ux1,−Ux2 + Ux1, 0, b̃1,−b̃1, b̃2,−b̃2∞,−∞},
for every x ∈ X . By the arguments of Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.3, if U ∈ U∗, then the following
linear programming problem is feasible with respect to ∆F̄Ux : Ax,U → R for every x ∈ X :
p1|x = 1 + ∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞,∞), (D.1)
p2|x = ∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1)−∆F̄Ux (∞,−Ux2, Ux2 − Ux1), (D.2)
p0|x = ∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,−Ux2,∞), (D.3)
∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (−Ux1,∞,∞), (D.4)
∆F̄Ux (∞,−Ux2,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,−Ux2,−∞), (D.5)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, Ux2 − Ux1) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,∞,−Ux2 + Ux1), (D.6)
∆F̄Ux (0,∞,∞) = 1/2, (D.7)
∆F̄Ux (∞, 0,∞) = 1/2, (D.8)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, 0) = 1/2, (D.9)
∆F̄Ux (b̂1 + b̃1,∞,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (−b̂1 − b̃1,∞,∞), (D.10)
∆F̄Ux (b̂2 + b̃2,∞,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (−b̂2 − b̃2,∞,∞), (D.11)
∆F̄Ux (∞, b̂1,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,−b̂1,−∞), (D.12)
∆F̄Ux (∞, b̂2,∞) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,−b̂2,−∞), (D.13)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, b̃1) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,∞,−b̃1), (D.14)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞, b̃2) = 1−∆F̄Ux (∞,∞,−b̃2), (D.15)
∆F̄Ux (∞, b̂1, b̃1)−∆F̄Ux (b̂1 + b̃1, b̂1, b̃1) = 0, (D.16)
∆F̄Ux (b̂1 + b̃1,∞,∞)−∆F̄Ux (b̂1 + b̃1, b̂1,∞)−∆F̄Ux (b̂1 + b̃1,∞, b̃1) + ∆F̄Ux (b̂1 + b̃1, b̂1, b̃1) = 0, (D.17)
∆F̄Ux (∞, b̂2, b̃2)−∆F̄Ux (b̂2 + b̃2, b̂2, b̃2) = 0, (D.18)
∆F̄Ux (b̂2 + b̃2,∞,∞)−∆F̄Ux (b̂2 + b̃2, b̂2,∞)−∆F̄Ux (b̂2 + b̃2,∞, b̃2) + ∆F̄Ux (b̂2 + b̃2, b̂2, b̃2) = 0, (D.19)
∆F̄Ux (−∞, t, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,2,U ×Ax,3,U , (D.20)
∆F̄Ux (t,−∞, q) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1,U ×Ax,3,U , (D.21)
∆F̄Ux (t, q,−∞) = 0 ∀(t, q) ∈ Ax,1,U ×Ax,2,U , (D.22)
∆F̄Ux (∞,∞,∞) = 1, (D.23)
0 ≤ ∆F̄Ux (t, q, r) ≤ 1 ∀(t, q, r) ∈ Ax,U , (D.24)
[−∆F̄ Ux (t, q, r) + ∆F̄
U
x (t
′, q, r) + ∆F̄ Ux (t, q
′, r)−∆F̄ Ux (t
′, q′, r)+
∆F̄ Ux (t, q, r
′)−∆F̄ Ux (t
′, q, r′)−∆F̄ Ux (t, q
′, r′) + ∆F̄ Ux (t
′, q′, r′)] ≥ 0
∀(t, q, r), (t′, q′, r′) ∈ Ax,U
s.t. (t, q, r) ≤ (t′, q′, r′). (D.25)
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In the linear programming above: (D.1)-(D.3) match the predicted conditional choice proba-
bilities with the empirical ones; (D.4)-(D.15) impose Assumption 5.2; (D.16)-(D.19) approximate
the degeneracy condition as discussed in Section 4.5.3; (D.20)-(D.25) ensure that ∆F̄Ux can be
extended to a proper conditional CDF.
E Additional details on the simulations
In this section, we report additional details on the simulations discussed in Section 5.
E.1 Normalisations
For shortness of exposition, we focus on the men’s side. Analogous arguments hold for the
women’s side. Appropriate location normalisations have been already imposed by Proposition
1, i.e., Ux0 = 0 for every x ∈ X . We also want to impose some scale normalisations. Here, we
distinguish our approach depending on whether Assumption 5.1 (independence between ∆εi and
Xi) is imposed. Specifically, when Assumption 5.1 is not imposed, we define
U ≡
{
(Uxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0) ∈ R|X×Y0|:
[location normalisation] Ux0 = 0 ∀x ∈ X




where the first condition is a location normalisation and the second condition is a scale normali-
sation.25 Instead, when Assumption 5.1 is imposed, we define
U ≡
{
(Uxy ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0) ∈ R|X×Y0|:
[location normalisation] Ux0 = 0 ∀x ∈ X




where the first condition is as before and the second condition is a different scale normalisation.26
Note that, when Assumption 5.1 is not imposed, we include one scale normalisation for each
x ∈ X . In fact, if U belongs to U∗ for some {∆Fx}x∈X , then any rescaled version of {∆Fx}x∈X







































induces some scalar multiples of U to also belong to U∗. Hence, the number of scale normalisations
to impose on U is equal to the number of conditional CDFs to recover, that is |X |. Instead, when
Assumption 5.1 is imposed, we include just one scale normalisation. This is because determining
whether U belongs to U∗ requires recovering only one admissible conditional CDF, ∆F , where
∆F ≡ ∆Fx ∀x ∈ X . Hence, when Assumption 5.1 is not imposed, we include more scale
normalisations than when Assumption 5.1 is imposed.
E.2 DGPs considered in the first simulation exercise
In DGPs 2 and 3, for both sides of the market, we assume that every mixture component has






































E.3 Computation of U true and V true
Under DGP1, one can compute U true and V true by using the Multinomial Logit formulas of Choo
and Siow (2006), i.e.,











for every (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Under DGP2 and DGP3, one can compute U true and V true by using









for every (x, y) ∈ X ×Y , where F ∗x ({py|x}y∈Y0) is the Legendre-Fenchel transform of Fx evaluated
at {py|x}y∈Y0 and G∗y({px|y}x∈X0) is the Legendre-Fenchel transform of Gy evaluated at {px|y}x∈X0 .
Under DGP2 and DGP3 F ∗x ({py|x}y∈Y0) and G∗y({px|y}x∈X0) cannot be computed in closed form
and, hence, we obtain them by simulation. Finally, we calculate their numerical derivatives.
F Inference
Section 4 studies identification by relying on the assumption that the empirical conditional choice
probabilities, {py|x}(x,y)∈X×Y0 and {px|y}(x,y)∈X0×Y , are known by the analyst. When conducting
inference, the analyst should replace them with consistent sample analogues, resulting from sam-
pling at random from the market at the individual level or at the household level. This section
illustrates how to construct a confidence region for the vector of parameters (U, V ). In particular,
we reformulate our problem using unconditional moment equalities and apply the bootstrap-based
procedure of Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017) (hereafter, BCS).
We assume, for simplicity, that our sample is composed by the same number, n, of men and
women. Given α ∈ (0, 1), a uniformly asymptotically valid (1− α)% confidence region for (U, V )
is obtained by inverting a test for the hypothesis
H0 : (U, V ) = (U0, V 0) vs. H1 : (U, V ) 6= (U0, V 0), (F.1)
given hypothetical values (U0, V 0). The test rejects H0 if TSn(U0, V 0) > ĉn,1−α(U0, V 0), where
TSn(U0, V 0) is a test statistic and ĉn,1−α(U0, V 0) is a critical value. The remainder of the section
explains how to compute TSn(U0, V 0) and ĉn,1−α(U0, V 0).
In order to define the test statistic, we start by introducing some useful notation. First, fix
U ∈ U and V ∈ V and rewrite the identifying restrictions,
py|x = κ(U,∆F̄Ux , y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
px|y = κ(V,∆ḠVy , x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y ,
(F.2)
as unconditional moment equalities. To do so, define
mi(U,∆F̄Ux , y) ≡ 1{Xi = x, Yi′ = y} − κ(U,∆F̄Ux , y)1{Xi = x} ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
mj(V,∆ḠVy , x) ≡ 1{Yj = y,Xj′ = x} − κ(V,∆ḠVy , x)1{Yj = y} ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y ,
where i′ and j′ denote the labels of the i and j’s spouse, respectively. Therefore, (F.2) is equivalent
to
E(mi(U,∆F̄Ux , y)) = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
E(mj(V,∆ḠVy , x)) = 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y .
(F.3)
Second, given (x, y) ∈ X ×Y , let SU,V,x,y be the collection of functions {∆F̄Ux }x∈X and {∆ḠVy }y∈Y
which are extendable to proper families of conditional CDFs in ∆F † and ∆G†, respectively, with
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support contained in the region B.
Third, define the sample analogue of (F.3) as





mi(U,∆F̄Ux , y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,





mj(V,∆ḠVy , x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y .
(F.4)
Thus, the analyst can use the following profiled test statistic:
TSn(U, V ) ≡ inf{
{∆F̄Ux }x∈X , {∆ḠVy }y∈Y
}
∈ SU,V,x,y
Qn(U, V ), (F.5)
where









Intuitively, TSn(U, V ) is built by imposing a penalty for each sample moment in (F.4) that is
different from zero, hence violating the population counterparts in (F.3).
In order to compute the critical value, BCS suggest two approximations to the distribution of
the profiled test statistic. In particular, as the first approximation, compute
TSDRn (U, V ) ≡ inf{










where ν∗n(U,∆F̄Ux , y) and ν∗n(V,∆ḠVy , x) are stochastic processes defined as





(mi(U,∆F̄Ux , y)− m̄n(U,∆F̄Ux , y))ζi,





(mj(V,∆ḠVy , x)− m̄n(V,∆ḠVy , x))ζj,
and {ζi}ni=1, {ζj}nj=1 are i.i.d. standard normals, independent of the data. Further, ŜU,V,x,y is the
set of minimisers of Qn(U, V ), i.e.,
ŜU,V,x,y ≡
{{
{∆F̄Ux }x∈X , {∆ḠVy }y∈Y
}




As the second approximation, compute
TSPRn (U, V ) ≡ inf{








n|ν∗n(V,∆ḠVy , x) + ln(V,∆ḠVy , x)|,
(F.7)
where ln(U,∆F̄Ux , y) and ln(V,∆ḠVy , x) are slackness functions defined as
ln(U,∆F̄Ux , y) ≡ κ−1n
√
nm̄n(U,∆F̄Ux , y),
ln(V,∆ḠVy , x) ≡ κ−1n
√
nm̄n(V,∆ḠVy , x),




Given (F.6) and (F.7), the critical value under H0, ĉn,1−α(U0, V 0), is the 1− α quantile of
TSMRn (U0, V 0) ≡ min{TSDRn (U0, V 0), TSPRn (U0, V 0)},
and can be computed via bootstrapping.
Once the 95% confidence region for (U, V ) is obtained by following the above procedure, we
project it along various dimensions to get the confidence regions for Φ, D(Φ), C(U) and C(V ).
Remark F.1. (Computational simplifications for inference) We outline a few important simplifi-
cations that help us to reduce the computational burden of the above procedure. First, note that
the minimisation problems in (F.5) and (F.7) can be rewritten as linear minimisation problems.
For instance, take (F.5). As shown for instance by Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1997) (Section 1,
p.18), (F.5) is equivalent to
inf{





x,y ∈ R ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0
τ+y,x, τ
−












x,y ≥ 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
τ+y,x, τ
−
y,x ≥ 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y ,
τ+x,y + τ−x,y = m̄n(U,∆F̄Ux , y) ∀(x, y) ∈ X × Y0,
τ+y,x + τ−y,x = m̄n(V,∆ḠVy , x) ∀(x, y) ∈ X0 × Y .
(F.8)
Given our identification arguments, (F.8) is a linear minimisation problem. Similar considerations
can be applied to (F.7).
Second, to construct a confidence region, the analyst should run the test (F.1) for every
(U, V ) ∈ U × V , which can be computationally burdensome. However, this can be simplified by
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exploiting Proposition 3. In fact, take any (U, V ), (Ũ , Ṽ ) ∈ U × V such that π(αx,l,U) = π(αx,l,Ũ)
and π(αy,l,V ) = π(αy,l,Ṽ ) for every l ∈ {1, ..., d}, x ∈ X , and y ∈ Y . Then, by Proposition 3,
TSn(U, V ) = TSn(Ũ , Ṽ ), TSDRn (U, V ) = TSDRn (Ũ , Ṽ ), and TSPRn (U, V ) = TSPRn (Ũ , Ṽ ). There-
fore, one can run the test (F.1) only for a handful of (U0, V 0) ∈ U × V .
Third, for the BCS’s method to work, it is enough for the set ŜU,V,x,y used in (F.6) to be a
good approximation of the set of minimisers of Qn(U, V ). For instance, BCS’s results hold as long
as ŜU,V,x,y contains one minimiser of Qn(U, V ). Therefore, the analyst can consider the minimiser
of Qn(U, V ) found when computing TSn(U, V ).
Fourth, note that the minimisation problems in (F.5), (F.6), and (F.7) can be made separable
across the two sides of the market if the two sides of the market are assumed to be stochastically
independent. In this case, the analyst can decompose each minimisation problem into two smaller
minimisation problems on both sides.
Fifth, if Assumption 5.1 is not imposed, then the men’s minimisation problem is further sepa-
rable across each type of men. Similarly, the women’s minimisation problem is further separable
across each type of women. Therefore, the analyst can decompose the men’s minimisation prob-
lem into |X | smaller minimisation problems. Similarly, the analyst can decompose the women’s
minimisation problem into |Y| smaller minimisation problems.
Lastly, to preserve linearity we have decided not to rescale the moment equalities by their
standard deviations. The cost is losing the scale invariance property of the test statistic. Some of
the earlier papers on inference for partially identified parameters, such as Chernozhukov, Hong,
and Tamer (2007), Romano and Shaikh (2008), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), consider modified
methods of moments estimators that are not scale invariant. However, Andrews and Soares (2010)
discuss that this may lead to poor power performances.

G Additional details on the empirical application
In this section, we present additional details on the empirical application discussed in Section 6.
Tables 5, 6, and 7 are based on the estimated identified sets of the parameters. To account for the
sampling uncertainty, below we report the projections of the corresponding 95% confidence regions
(Tables G.1, G.2, and G.3). These confidence regions are constructed by using the bootstrap-
based procedure of Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2017) as discussed in Appendix F. The intervals in
Tables G.1, G.2, and G.3 are equal to or contain the intervals in Tables 5, 6, and 7, respectively.
The fact that some intervals in Tables G.1, G.2, and G.3 are equal to the intervals in Tables 5,
6, and 7, respectively, could be due to the fact that we constructed the estimated identified sets
and confidence regions by evaluating a coarse grid of parameter values.
Tables G.4, G.5, and G.6 report the projections of the estimated identified sets of U , V , Φ,
D(Φ), C(U), and C(V ) under specification [7] of Table 1. We have highlighted in blue the numbers
that differ from Tables 5, 6, and 7.
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{−2, 0} [−1.9091, 6.7778]
(−∞,−0.0707] [0.0297,∞)











































































D44,33(Φ) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Table G.1: Projections of the 95% confidence regions for Φ and D(Φ) under specification [5] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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C43(U) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Table G.2: Projections of the 95% confidence regions for U and C(U) under specification [5] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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C43(V ) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Table G.3: Projections of the 95% confidence regions for V and C(V ) under specification [5] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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D44,33(Φ) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) [0.1818,∞)
Table G.4: Projections of the estimated identified sets of Φ and D(Φ) under specification [7] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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[−0.6667, 0.6667] [−2.2424, 0.1414]

























































[−0.6667, 0.6667] [−2.2424, 0.1414]























































[−0.6667, 0.6667] [−2.2424, 0.1414]
−1 [−0.8485, 0.6364]
[−0.8182, 0.8182] [0.0606,∞)
C43(U) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) [−0.3565,∞)
Table G.5: Projections of the estimated identified sets of U and C(U) under specification [7] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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C43(V ) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞) (−∞,∞)
Table G.6: Projections of the estimated identified sets of V and C(V ) under specification [7] of Table 1. “1” denotes high school dropouts;
“2” denotes high school graduates; “3” denotes some college; “4” denotes four-year college graduates and graduate degrees.
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